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SUMMARY

Previous research in organizational theory, labor market economics, and nonprofit
studies are applied to churches and their clergy leadership in advancing a theory of clergy
executive compensation. The present study, characterizes churches as missionmaximizing nonprofits operating in a religious market. The data for this study come
from the end of year reports from approximately 800 local churches of the North Georgia
Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church for the years 2007-2008 and a survey
administered in order to glean the personal characteristics of the clergy. The
investigation employs a clergy compensation framework and finds that clergy salaries are
influenced in part by personal characteristics, human capital, organizational elements,
labor market factors, and clergy performance.
The degree to which clergy, as agents, achieve the aims of their principal, the
church and/or denomination, is the main avenue through which we can understand what
factors influence clergy salaries. Denominational churches achieve their goals through a
hierarchical relationship suggestive of a nonprofit franchise. The franchise / hierarchical
arrangement places clergy in a "dual agency" tension. Clergy affiliated with hierarchical
denominations operate as dual agents because they serve two principals, the
congregation, and the denomination. If clergy are in autonomous churches, the local
church is the sole principal.
Ordination stratifies the labor market differentiating clergy from their nonordained colleagues. Further, ordination functions as a signal of commitment to the
denomination and legitimacy to the laity resulting in financial benefit to ministers.
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Clergy are also rewarded on the basis of managerial scope, where they receive higher
wages as compensation for their assumed managerial acumen and responsibility.
This study also recognizes that clergy operate in a labor market. Churches
without a hierarchy have a labor market that is comparatively more competitive. The
present research suggests that within the more autonomous denominations there may also
be market stratification on the basis of some attribute that differentiates clergy from one
another and signals commitment.
The results regarding the role of credentialing in stratified labor markets have
implications for policy. The present research adds to the nonprofit executive
compensation literature by suggesting that denominational churches are analogous to
nonprofit franchises and by empirically testing for "dual agency", labor market
stratification, and managerial scope.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
The church is a unique institution because few organizations claim divine origins.
The language used to describe the church emphasizes the distinction. When we use
words like holy, sacred, and spiritual to describe the church, we give the sense that the
church is otherworldly and beyond our comprehension. Although the church has several
distinguishing characteristics, churches and clergy are in many ways similar to
organizations and workers outside of the religious context.
For example, religious organizations function in a market where demanders and
suppliers of religious goods and services meet for exchange. There exists a labor market
for clergy where available clergy find employment and churches seek employable clergy
at a determined wage. Like other organizations, churches seek to attain a specific
mission within the context of organizational constraints. Ministers possess individual
characteristics and motivation that serve them in their work. The purpose of the present
study is to advance a theory of clergy executive compensation based on nonprofit
research, organizational theory, and labor market economics.
Executive compensation for clergy gained public attention recently when some
religious nonprofit leaders were investigated at the urging of Sen. Charles Grassley and
the Senate Finance Committee (Sataline, 2007). The purpose of the inquiry was to
ascertain whether the ministries participated in for-profit activities where they were
avoiding tax payments and to determine if the ministers benefited personally from the
ministry. The interest in ministerial salaries parallels the scrutiny of pay levels for other
nonprofit executives. Although much of the scholarship has been in the proprietary
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sector, the nonprofit sector demonstrates an interest in the subject of executive salaries as
illustrated by The Chronicle of Philanthropy's annual listing of the salaries of nonprofit
leaders.
Questions regarding nonprofit compensation practices became salient and
garnered particular scrutiny because of several factors. Leete (2006) observes a carryover effect from the critique of for-profit sector salaries as for-profit executive
compensation increased. For-profit executive compensation practices shifted toward
linking the manager’s salary with organizational fiscal performance in an effort to
address the classical agency problem and align the interests of shareholders and leaders.
Similarly, according to the annual survey of the Chronicle of Philanthropy (Barton and
Gose, 2008), nonprofit executive salaries at the largest nonprofits have increased as well
over time. Accordingly, nonprofit stakeholders sought ways to link the wages of
nonprofit managers to mission-related outcomes. The prevailing challenge for nonprofits
seeking to link pay to performance was defining appropriate measures of performance
that were quantifiable.
There were also several scandals involving nonprofit leaders and their salaries
that raised questions of excessive executive compensation (Leete, 2006). The board of
regents of the Smithsonian Institute admitted that they had fallen asleep at the wheel
regarding the oversight of the secretary (executive director) who used the nonprofit’s
funds for chauffeurs and private planes (Grimaldi, 2007; Independent Review Committee
Smithsonian Institution, 2007). Intensifying the debate on nonprofit executive
compensation are recent efforts by Congress, state attorneys general, and several private
organizations to improve the accountability of charities.
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The determinants of clergy executive compensation is the research question
undertaken by this investigation. By analyzing a unique data set of over 700 churches
and their clergy leaders, this study intends to test several hypotheses about the
determinants of clergy executive compensation. The religious marketplace provides the
conceptual context for the present investigation.
1.1 The Religious Marketplace
Religious markets, the arenas for exchange of religious goods and services, are
comprised of religious producers and religious consumers. We will assume that religious
producers seek to optimize some measure of organizational success like members or
resources (e.g. financial, political, or social capital) while competing with each other.
Religious consumers seek to fulfill their varied religious needs. The behaviors of
religious leaders and churches are modeled as rational responses to opportunities and
constraints found within the religious market (Iannaccone and Berman, 2006). The
successful religious producer is the one that "competes well" and provides an attractive
religious product in exchange for "time, money, and commitment" (Roof, 1999).
Finke and Starke (2005) chronicle the religious history and the growth of
denominations in the United States in terms of religious markets. One of the
characteristics of the religious environment in America is intense competition since there
is no established national religion (Finke and Starke, 2005). The lack of a state religion
serves to explain the pluralistic nature of the religious market place in America from its
inception. Finke and Starke (2005) use the term “entrepreneurial religion” to describe
churches and clergy that engage in innovative activities to reach people. However, not all
churches and clergy possess entrepreneurial characteristics which contribute to achieving
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objectives related to the mission. The authors illustrate that there are distinct
characteristics of churches and clergy that are “winners and losers in a free market
religious environment” by applying a church-sect typology, an organizational
development model, developed by Max Weber and Ernst Troeltsch (Niebuhr, 1929).
Churches normally do not begin as institutional structures but more as faith
movements on the fringes of religion. Sects are those groups that are in high tension with
the social-cultural environment. Persons drawn to sects seek a faith that is strict and
otherworldly while those in churches do not want such features. According to Niebuhr
(1929), church congregants prefer a more accommodating faith that allows members to
operate in a relationship of low-tension with the environment. Sects bear the character of
voluntary associations while churches are established institutions.
Niebuhr (1929) asserts that the sectarian type of organization remains present for
only one generation. Successful sects transform into established churches as children are
born and the sect takes on the role of a socializing institution training the second
generation in the discipline and norms of the tradition. The former sect begins to
accommodate to societal norms in its ethical stance decreasing the environmental cultural
tension. As the former sect becomes a church, some members may perceive “mission
drift” resulting in a schism within the church body. The faction that secedes births a new
sect and the process begins again.
In the religious marketplace, sects and churches compete for religious market
share. Finke and Starke (2005) describe how established churches employed “cartel
agreements” which served as barriers to entry to sects. For example, in 1801 the
Presbyterians and the Congregationalists created a Plan of Union for western expansion
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where they had “noncompeting missionary efforts” for access to exclusive markets.
However, the upstart sects employed vigorous marketing techniques (e.g. revivals) to
draw consumers away from the churches. As religious groups supplied innovative
religious products, they experienced success in the religious market (Roof, 1999).
The success of the sects was attributed to their ability to meet the differentiated
religious preferences of the American frontier. The winners, as described by Finke and
Starke, were the Methodists and the Baptists and the losers were the Presbyterians and
the Congregationalists. According to the researchers, the Methodists and the Baptists in
the 1800’s had an organizational structure that was suited for growth and accumulation of
market share. The Methodist and Baptist clergy were not from the educated classes.
Their leadership was “home grown.”
The educational requirement of the Presbyterians and the Congregationalists
created a labor supply problem. Well-educated clergy have higher costs associated with
their employment and their deployment. The low overhead costs associated with
establishing churches gave the Methodists and the Baptists a distinct advantage. In
addition, having local preachers decreased the social distance between parson and
parishioner. Members felt they could relate better to a minister who was one of their
own.
Consistent with the sect-church model, the successful Methodist sect became the
Methodist Church. As a result, the denomination began to experience a membership
decline and a loss of market share, as the local democratic form of local preachers gave
way to a centralized clerical hierarchy with an increasingly affluent membership and
professionalized clergy (Finke and Starke, 2005). The membership decline of mainline
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protestant denominations since the 1960’s is well documented (McKinney and Finke,
2002).
The United Methodist Church experienced a decline of 7.0% during the 1980’s
alone from 9,519,407 members to 8,853,455 members (General Commission on Archives
and History, 2009). The decline continued into the 21st century as the 2008 membership
was reported as 7,853,987 (National Council of Churches, 2010). Nonetheless, during
the 1990’s clergy salaries rose 5% overall and 10% (figures adjusted for inflation) in the
southeastern U.S. outpacing inflation (McMillan and Price, 2001).
1.2 Executive Compensation
Because of American sentiments about money and what it represents (Hacker,
1997), there is no more contentious subject than that of executive compensation.
Scholars suggest that pay serves several functions. Salary has a motivational effect and
serves as an incentive that affects decisions made and strategies adopted by business
leaders, both of which affect firm performance (Finkelstein and Boyd, 1998).
Remuneration is an indicator of value for executives. Pay is a means for employees to
realize rewards for their efforts. In a for-profit context, executives and other employees
can participate in the firm’s profitability. Therefore, when an executive makes sound
decisions and engages in profitable strategies, the executive and the organization are
financially rewarded.
If executives are utility maximizers, as economic theory suggests (Ross, 1973),
then compensation also serves as an evaluation indicator for executives as they weigh
their own personal risks, cost-benefits, and time horizons (Finkelstein and Boyd, 1998).
Managers weigh the level of compensation in a given organization in light of
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compensation in other organizations, personal goals, both financial and intrinsic, and time
to retirement. Salary levels may also affect stakeholder perceptions of the firm by
suggesting that the firm is operated well by capable leadership, who by virtue of their
competence, are deserving of the pay or that the firm is inefficient with workers who are
overpaid.
Executive compensation for the nonprofit is viewed somewhat differently. For
nonprofits, wages are weighed against applying the organization's resources to the
mission more explicitly than in the for-profit context. It is difficult for a nonprofit
organization to justify large remuneration to its executives when, as mandated by its taxexempt status under section 501(c) of the tax code, it cannot distribute profits to
individuals (Hansmann, 1987).
The tax-exempt classification serves as an indicator that the organization serves
public purposes rather than personal interests (Salamon, 2002). A salary level deemed
appropriate in a for-profit context might not be viewed as appropriate in a nonprofit
context because it signals self-interest or a diversion of the organization’s resources from
the mission (Leete, 2006; Young, 1984). Because of their role as bearers of the public
trust, nonprofit organizations are expected to behave differently from their for-profit
counterparts. The religious context is particularly sensitive to the issue of handling
money because resources do not belong to individuals but are managed as a stewardship
(Wuthnow, 1997).
Stewardship defines the relationship between not only the believer and the Divine,
but also the relationship between the believer and material possessions (Wuthnow, 1997).
A stewardship perspective subscribes to a supposed distinction between the natural and
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divine order (Wuthnow, 1994) where the pursuit of material goods conflicts with
accomplishing divine aims. In this view, a good steward is one who uses material
resources for higher ends and shuns personal self-interest. Religious nonprofits therefore,
as it relates to finances, are in a double-bind of being both nonprofit and religious and are
held to an even higher standard of accountability and scrutiny.
Churches, like many other nonprofits, must face what Salamon refers to as the
human resource challenge (Salamon, 2002). There has been a consistent decline over the
last generation in persons choosing to enter the ranks of the clergy (Chaves, 2002). Some
scholars assert that the inability to recruit talented and qualified leaders is because of the
inability of churches to pay adequate compensation to clergy (McMillan and Price, 2001;
Chaves, 2002; Chaves, 2004).
The clergy labor market has both a supply and a demand side. On the supplyside, clergy enter the market by demonstrating a “calling” (Perl and Chang, 2000; Oden,
1983). The demand-side of the clergy labor market is defined by the congregational or
denominational polity. The demand for clergy is met by the local church’s hiring process
or by a denominational hierarchy’s appointive process. Religious organizations have a
process, either formal or informal, by which the call is legitimized and clergy are
credentialed for congregational leadership.
Clergy overall, with a few exceptions, have experienced a consistent decline in
real income since the late 1960’s and are losing competitiveness relative to other
professionals (Hudnut-Beumler, 1999, McMillan and Price, 2003). Hudnut-Beumler
(1999) offered several explanations. Clergy experienced a decline in status as they were
"de-centered" from a prominent position among cultural elites. Hudnut-Beumler
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highlighted ideological arguments where clergy became less distinguished as a vocational
class. Vatican II made the priesthood less "special" as the priesthood of all believers,
where the view that each Christian was a minister, was espoused. The implication was
that if all were ministers, then what was distinctive about the clergy separating them from
the laity. Further, clergy seemed no longer willing to bear the weight as "arbiters of
moral and theological truth". In essence, according to Hudnut-Beumler (1999), clergy
were co-conspirators in their own devaluation.
There is an alternative explanation. Religious production is difficult to quantify
and subsequently difficult to evaluate. Since many persons are unaware of the activities
of a pastor (McMillan, 2002), it is difficult to assess the value of the work. Further, if
Hudnut Beumler (1999) is correct in the perception among Christians that all are
ministers, the implication is that anyone can perform ministerial tasks. The risk is that
the work will be undervalued since clergy cannot justify a higher wage for their efforts
and consumers of religious services will seek out lower priced substitutes.
Some may view the discounted salary as part of the call similar to the “donative
labor hypothesis” in nonprofit theory, public-service motivation,, or "psychic income"
where persons receive non-pecuniary benefits for their work (Hatt, 1950; Leete, 2006;
Bright, 2009). Iannaccone and Berman (2006) suggest that low wages are a means of
reducing fraud in religious institutions. The clergy are more convincing when they do
not prosper materially from the believers’ faith and when the salaries are low compared
to the clergy’s skill level. An alternative explanation is that since religion is a vocationbased sector, the low salaries serve as a screening device for unsuitable candidates
(Heyes, 2005). Consequently, increased wages would decrease the number of clergy who
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have a true calling and attract persons without a vocation. Bonifield and Mills (1980)
state that low salaries are a result of clergy serving churches where their work is not
valued because of the perceived availability of substitutes.
Low clergy salaries in the Protestant context have historical precedents in at least
two religious traditions: Roman Catholicism and Judaism. The Roman Catholic clergy
vow of poverty (Finke, 1997) associated with religious orders which symbolized humility
and a disaffection for worldly material goods, in a practical sense, served to reduce the
costs of labor for a given diocese. In Jewish tradition, the Mishnah warned scholars
against using the Torah for material gain (Roth, 1997). Knowledge of holy writ was for
the glory of God and the benefit of the people and not for amassing personal wealth.
Clergy are viewed as a group in much the same way that people are grouped in society
(Wilder, 1978) (e.g. class, gender, race, and orientation). The ramification is that an
economic prescription imposed on one group of clergy impacts other clergy.
The subject of executive compensation for clergy is compelling for several
reasons. Religious congregations hold a prominent place in American society. There are
over 300,000 houses of worship in the United States (Chaves, 2002), representing a
multiplicity of faiths. The National Council of Churches (2006), an ecumenical Christian
organization in the U.S., reported that its membership included 105,421 congregations
representing 44,154,806 members and 80,062 pastors, not including clients and
constituents.
In the United States, religious congregations hold a privileged status among
nonprofit organizations because they automatically receive tax-exemption (Anheier,
2005). The Internal Revenue Code considers advancing religion as a charitable purpose.
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Religious organizations and houses of worship that receive charitable donations are
classified as 501(c)3 and are exempt from federal taxation (IRS, 2009). Further, the
government does not impose its reporting requirements on congregations because of the
interpretation of the constitutional mandate for separation of church and state (Anheier,
2005).
As nonprofit organizations, churches and their leaders are subject to the “nondistribution constraint” (Steinberg, 2006; Hansmann, 1987). One of the tests to qualify as
a nonprofit is that the entity must show that the organization’s assets and amassed
surpluses may not be distributed, except for fair compensation, to the benefit of members,
managers, or founders (Anheier, 2005). According to Giving USA 2009, religious giving
in 2008 was 106.89 billion dollars representing 35% of all charitable giving. Since
houses of worship garner the lion's share of charitable contributions it is imperative that
churches expend funds according to the tax code and are held accountable.
The subject of nonprofit accountability spans several topics including internal
governance issues, fiscal probity, self-inurement, mission drift, and effectiveness (Brody,
2002). The idea of self-inurement (i.e. personally benefiting from the organization’s
resources) is at the core of the arguments pertaining to nonprofit executive compensation.
Deliberations concerning money are not neutral affairs (Hacker, 1997). Our curiosity
wants an accounting of why a salary is comparatively high or low from our own point of
view. Because very little is understood as to how ministerial wages are determined there
is the danger of misinterpreting what a high or low salary means. Understanding the
underlying assumptions of clergy compensation and the inter-relationship between
factors that contribute to clergy salary levels will help to increase accountability.
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Accountability is a process where organizations are held responsible for
performance and behavior within a particular environmental context (Young, 2002).
Nonprofit accountability is a complex and difficult subject because of the competing and
sometimes conflicting demands of stakeholders (Brody, 2002). Nonprofits do not have
owners in the same sense as for-profits. Shareholders own for-profit organizations by
virtue of capital participation through stock. In contrast, nonprofits have stakeholders. A
stakeholder is anyone who can make a claim, real or imagined, on the organization
(Anheier, 2005).
Stakeholders are both inside and external to the organization. Internal
stakeholders include paid and unpaid staff, managers, clients, donors, and the board. The
government and its representatives, the nonprofit sector, the media, and the public as a
whole, represent some of the external stakeholders to whom the nonprofit is accountable
in some way. Ideally, the board of directors functions on behalf of the stakeholders by
governing the activities of the nonprofit, ensuring fiscal probity and mission attainment.
However, each group within the multiplicity of stakeholders may view accountability
differently (Brody, 2002).
As the public calls for increasing accountability on the part of nonprofits, one of
the first areas to be examined is executive compensation. Similarly, when a church falls
under public scrutiny the salary of the pastor is called into question. As public-serving
entities, churches and clergy are not exempt from examination in matters of
compensation.
This paper builds on previous clergy compensation, nonprofit wage setting, and
organizational theory and research, and studies the churches of the North Georgia Annual
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Conference of the United Methodist Church. This investigation considers a variety of
factors including human capital, personal characteristics, organizational factors, religious
market competition, clergy labor markets, and the principal-agent relationship. These
factors are of interest because of their applicability specifically to the church context in
the determination of clergy executive compensation.
Overall, this thesis offers a framework and tests a theory for clergy executive
compensation which encompasses the following constructs. Previous clergy
compensation research grounds the investigation in agency theory (Zech, 2007). Agency
theory, or principal-agent theory, assumes there is a misalignment between the interests
of self-serving managers (agents) who, without appropriate monitoring and reward
arrangements (contracts), will shirk their duties to the firm (the principal) (Ross, 1973;
Eisenhardt, 1989; Barkema and Gomez-Mejia, 1998). When principal-agent theory is
applied to the local church and clergy, in its simplest form, the church is the principal and
the clergy is the agent. In the case of churches affiliated with a denominational
hierarchy, clergy are the agents of an additional principal, the denomination. The dual
agency relationship creates a dyadic tension for clergy that affects their salary levels.
Ministerial salaries are determined within a specific congregational context. For
example, American congregations function with a specific polity, they are located within
different communities, and their membership sizes differ. Clergy may function in a solo
pastorate or as a part of a ministerial team.
Like other workers, clergy possess certain characteristics that may be valuable to
an employer. Rewards are expected for investment in human capital. Similarly, personal
characteristics may also be of benefit to a worker and increase wages. Unfortunately, due
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to gender and racial biases, other personal characteristics may result in lower salaries
across a given sample.
Do all clergy compete against each other in an open labor market? Many clergy
compete only against ministers from their denomination. Further, the denominational
market is generally limited by geography (e.g. states, region, or an annual conference)
although transfers do occur. Within an Annual Conference, the basic unit of governance
for the United Methodist Church in a geographic area, there are thirteen different
categories of clergy based on their conference relationship. Conference relationship is
determined primarily by ordination status. Ordination is a religious rite signifying that a
person is an authorized representative of the faith (Campbell, 1988). Ordination also
signals a labor commitment to the denomination as well as the annual conference, and
creates a stratified labor market where clergy compete for positions.
The present analysis also seeks to account for the variance in salaries among
upper-stratum (ordained) and lower-stratum (non-ordained) clergy members of the North
Georgia Annual Conference. The determinants of compensation in one stratum may not
be significant in another stratum. For example, tenure or experience may be significant
in the case of ordained clergy as opposed to non-ordained clergy.
In order to investigate these constructs, this study employs several academic
disciplines and a multiple-lens strategy for theory development (Sabatier, 1999).
According to Sabatier (1999), it is imperative that theorists demonstrate the ability to
employ differing theoretical perspectives in their work. Applying multiple lenses
requires theorists to acknowledge the assumptions, boundaries, and shortcomings of
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particular theories. Theories are not universal in their application. Some theories work
better under certain circumstances than others.
Sociologists have traditionally studied ministers and churches examining clergy
attitudes and the role of religion in society (Bonifield and Mills, 1980). This study goes
beyond traditional sociology to encompass organizational studies, nonprofit research,
religious studies, public policy, and labor market economics. There are also applications
for this research in communities outside the academy.
This study also has implications beyond the religious context as well. For
example, the government has an interest in the salaries of clergy. In its monitoring role,
the government cannot allow nonprofits to violate the nondistribution constraint. Beyond
the monitoring role, government-nonprofit relations have been extended to houses of
worship because of the Faith-Based Initiative (Pew Forum for Religion and Public Life,
2003). As principals, when engaging in public-private partnerships with churches, the
government has an interest in knowing that its agents will contribute to the public's
interest and not their own self-interest.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Chapter Two provides a survey of the
pertinent literature in order to place the executive compensation framework in the context
of previous scholarly work. Chapter Three describes a proposed clergy compensation
framework, the data, the variables, and the empirical model for investigating the
determinants relating to clergy salaries. Chapter Four explains the results of the model
and the findings with respect to the foregoing constructs. The investigation concludes
with Chapter Five devoted to discussion, policy implications, limitations, and next steps
for research.
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
This chapter addresses several goals. First, the chapter demonstrates how the
scholarship utilized to explain the existence and development of the nonprofit sector
applies directly to churches. Third, the literature review illustrates how churches and
clergy are similar to other organizational forms and their workers. Fourth, the survey
highlights the empirical similarities found in the nonprofit executive and clergy
compensation literatures. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the factors that
contribute to ministerial pay in previous clergy compensation research.
2.1 The Church and Nonprofit Organizational Research
Religious organizations provided the foundations for early American society and
the nonprofit sector (Anheier, 2005). Although churches and religious nonprofits have
operated as a part of the American landscape for centuries, little scholarship exists which
links them to the nonprofit sector, e.g. examines churches from the nonprofit perspective
(Cadge and Wuthnow, 2006). This dearth of research is intriguing since research
traditionally applied to nonprofit organizations transfers easily to the study of religious
organizations.
Cadge and Wuthnow (2006) observe that some scholars subscribe to the view of
secularization wherein religious participation is soon to be decreasing in American
society, while others (Chaves, 1994) assert that the historical role of religion is changing
as persons affiliate with specialized organizations besides religious ones. The advent of
Charitable Choice, the legislation permitting religious organizations to compete for
public funding for providing social services, and the extension of the White House Office
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of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives highlight the significance of identifying
churches as not merely religious institutions, but also as service-providing religious
nonprofits and applying nonprofit scholarship to the study of such organizations.
How does nonprofit theory apply to churches? Previous scholars have understood
nonprofit organizations in terms of three failures: market failure, government failure, and
contract failure (Steinberg, 2006). These theories also provide a rationale for the role of
churches in providing religious goods.
In classical theory, markets seek to provide goods and services at an optimal
efficient level where marginal benefits are just offset by marginal costs and production
efficiency is assumed (Steinberg, 2006). Market failure occurs where there are
externalities, economies of scale, public goods or other conditions inhibiting efficient
levels of production.
Markets operate best in the provision of private goods where consumption is
limited to paying customers. We have seen for-profit firms enter into certain nonprofit
realms like hospitals and education yet there is no evidence of “for-profit” churches in the
sense of a for-profit business although some churches may be more "business-like" in the
pejorative sense focusing more on the market than achieving the mission.
Weisbrod’s public goods theory provides insight into the existence of religious
nonprofits, e.g churches, in the United States (Weisbrod, 1977). The inability or
unwillingness of the government to provide all goods or services for which demand
exceeds marginal costs is termed “government failure” (Steinberg, 2006). In Weisbrod’s
view, nonprofits provide public goods in cases where the government cannot or will not
provide them. The government will provide goods consistent with preferences at the
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demand level of the median voter, satisfying a majority of the population demanding
public and quasi-public goods. However, appealing to the median voter alone will not
satisfy all existing demand. Unmet demand results from demand heterogeneity or
diversity of preferences. Further, since there are constitutional restrictions that prevent
the government’s provision or sponsorship of religious activity in the United States
(Anheier, 2005), although there are examples of state-sponsored religion elsewhere,
churches and other religious organizations address the unmet preferences for religious
public goods.
Nonprofits also arise because of contract failure (Steinberg, 2006). Under
circumstances where service quality cannot be easily evaluated, consumers will choose a
nonprofit service provider they deem more trustworthy because of the absence of the
profit motive (Hansmann, 1987). In such cases, there are information asymmetries where
the seller knows more about the quality of the service than the buyer (Anheier, 2005).
The usual contract mechanisms, found in market transactions, fail because of the
accompanying monitoring costs associated with governing the contracting and evaluating
the service provided. In the case of religious goods, it is difficult for parishioners to
monitor the activities of clergy and churches related to religious goods production and
assess the quality of such services.
Religion, in America, has been viewed historically as a public good (Anderson,
1988; Lipford, et.al., 1993). Public goods have two distinct characteristics, nonexcludability and non-rivalry (Anheier, 2005). The public good attribute of religion is
that there is benefit to the community from the presence of a religious populace because
of the espoused values of many religions of being of service to humanity. The advantage
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to society of healthy religion is non-excludable and non-rival. Drawing on the nonprofit
theory, the public good nature of religion serves as a deterrent to for-profit firms and
government entering into religious goods production.
Public goods theory is insufficient by itself to explain the existence of churches
and religious nonprofit because religious goods have private aspects. Buchanan defines
club goods as goods that are not purely private or purely public (Buchanan, 1965).
Hansmann’s prior work examined social clubs and found them to be an exception to
contract failure theory. In the case of country clubs, the patrons were able to judge the
quality of the services. The nonprofit form allowed the consumers to have control over
the enterprise. The exception resulted in consumer control theory. As in the case of the
country club, there are also social determinants accompanying church affiliation.
Niebuhr (1929) observed that social aspirations and affinity serve to define church
membership much like a social club.
According to Sandler and Tschirhart (1997), a club shares the following
characteristics. Clubs are voluntary. They are formed for mutual benefit. Clubs share
production costs, common member characteristics, an excludable good, or a combination
of one or more of these elements (Sandler and Tschirhart, 1997). Through the form of
the club, an institution can limit access to the good by others and impose costs, both
pecuniary and otherwise, for its use (Sandler and Tschirhart, 1997).
Nonprofit organizations are structurally diverse. Hansmann (1987) categorizes
nonprofits on the basis of revenue source and control. Donative nonprofits are those who
receive the bulk of their revenues from donations, while commercial nonprofits are
funded by fees-for-service and the sale of goods. In the case where the locus of control,
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the ability to elect the firm’s governing body, is in the hands of the patrons, Hansmann
refers to such organizations as mutual nonprofits. Entrepreneurial nonprofits, in contrast,
operate with a self-perpetuating board. According to Hansmann’s typology categorizing
nonprofit firms, churches fall into the category of “donative mutual” nonprofits
(Hansmann, 1987).
Churches are voluntary membership organizations (Chaves, 2004). As a donative
mutual nonprofit, with few exceptions, the control is in the hands of the members.
Consumer control theory (Hansmann, 1987) applies to the case of religious congregations
in that patrons adopt the nonprofit form in an effort to ensure control over the work
(Hansmann, 1987). Churches are customer-controlled firms in as much as members
provide the revenues through offerings and serve on the governing board. As such,
churches may be viewed as religious nonprofit clubs (Klick, 2006).
Estelle James (1987) suggests that the classical economic theories for the
existence of nonprofits ignore their religious origins. In contrast, she posits demand and
supply-side explanations for the existence of the nonprofit sector. Although James’s
research focuses on nonprofit firms outside of the American context, her analysis has
implications for understanding the role played by American religious congregations.
On the demand-side, James addresses two elements: excess demand and
differentiated demand (1987). According to the theory of excess demand, private
voluntary firms will provide the production of quasi-public goods when there is limited
government supply. James then addresses the question of limited supply on the part of
government. She theorizes about the needs of the unmet demanders. Since the
government will only supply goods at the level of the median voter, what then happens to
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the demand preferences of the minority? James proposes that the median voter theory
falls short of addressing inequities in political power. Her contribution is that in cases
when there is a high degree of variability in the perceived costs and benefits of
government provided quasi-public goods and services, a private voluntary sector will
emerge to address the excess demand of the underrepresented and disempowered (1987).
Differentiated demand reflects the type of service rather than the amount of
service provision. Several differentiating factors would contribute to the growth of a
private sector providing goods and services (James, 1987). If the preferences were
deeply held due to religious or cultural differences, then the private sector would grow
due to the heterogeneous demand. Additional cases occur where the government is
constrained to provide a homogeneous product, where government due to geographic
dispersion cannot meet the diversity of tastes efficiently, or the dominant group in the
culture cannot enforce their preferences leaving private production as an option.
Churches, as suggested by James, address the varying and intense product requirements
characteristic of religious pluralism.
James (1987) also provides a supply-side rationale for the emergence of nonprofit
service provision. Among her explanations is religious motivation. Ideologues are
value-based entrepreneurs that gravitate toward the nonprofit sector (Anheier, 2005).
James (1987, 1989) sees nonprofits as organizations that promote socialization and group
identification. As such, entrepreneurs will develop organizations that provide services to
a particular group while promoting their own values. Gill (2001) describes churches as
“proselytizing religious firms” that operate as “faith maximizers” seeking to win as many
faith-adherents as they can. For example, parochial schools provide not only education,
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but also religious indoctrination as proselytizing religious organizations seeking
constituents.
Church denominations are similar to other firms as described by Coase (1937).
The firm serves as an organized basic unit of production that weighs costs and benefits in
the production of goods and services. Organizing a firm is more efficient than enacting
individual contracts for each transaction when monitoring the multiplicity of individual
contracts is cost prohibitive.
Coase states that organizations save on transaction costs when an authority directs
the resources. Firms become larger with the addition of transactions. Additional
transactions, then, cause the firm to incur more costs. Denominations form by organizing
local churches into a system of relationships in order to deliver a product with lower
transaction costs. The organizational form of choice, for monopolists, is often the
federated / franchise system (Young and Faulk, 2010). In their investigation, Young and
Faulk (2010) characterize nonprofit franchises along two dimensions: 1) the relationship
between the main body and the affiliated groups and 2) the degree of homogeneity among
the associated organizations. Central organization control can range from a decentralized
support role to an arrangement where the locus of control rests with the central body.
Affiliate groups can vary from uniform to diverse in terms of homogeneity.
Applying a franchise model to churches is not novel. In Wealth of Nations, Adam
Smith likened the medieval church to a corporate franchise (Anderson, 1988). In the case
of denominational churches, the denomination attempts to strike a balance between
homogeneous affiliates that operate in the same manner and heterogeneous affiliates that
apply different methods based on community needs (Young and Faulk, 2010). As a
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system, the local church and the denomination employ the same symbols, resources, and
share a common identity.
The denomination must also strike a balance in terms of its authority. As in the
Young and Faulk taxonomy, control is balanced although it is under the auspices of a
centralized authority. For example, in the United Methodist church, the central body, the
denomination, does not fully control the local church because although the
denominational structure deploys and appoints clergy leadership through its
representative the bishop, the churches pay apportionments, e.g. franchise fees or taxes
(Oster, 1992), to the denomination and governs itself at the local level. Essentially, the
denomination operates as a rent seeker from the downstream local church. It is in the
denomination's best interest, regardless of denominational structure, to deploy clergy
leadership, e.g. franchise operators, who are amenable to the congregation and will
ensure that the franchise fees are paid.
2.2 Executive Compensation Literature
An extensive literature exists on executive compensation outside of the religious
sector (Barkema and Gomez-Mejia, 1998). In Figure 2.1, Barkema and Gomez-Mejia
(1998) presents a general framework for executive compensation determinants in the forprofit context. This framework provides a point of departure for the present study yet
does not fully transfer to the religious context. For example, in the compensation box,
the long-term orientation refers to equity participation for for-profit executives who may
benefit from stock ownership, an arrangement that does not exist for nonprofit executives
including clergy.
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A General Framework for Executive Compensation

Criteria
Performance
Size
Market
Peer compensation
Individual characteristics
Role or position
Compensation
Pay Level
Long-Term Orientation
Pay-performance link

Governance
Ownership structure
Board of directors
Remuneration committee
Market for corporate control
General public
Contingencies
Strategy
R&D level
Market growth
Demand instability
Industry regulation
National culture
Tax system

Barkema and Gomez-Mejia (1998)

Figure 2.1 A General Framework for Executive Compensation

The majority of for-profit executive compensation research focuses on the link
between pay and performance. Linking compensation to financial performance is a
difficult matter. What types of measures are relevant? Should the organization use
accounting performance measures that affect cash compensation or stock performance
that relates to stock options as compensation (Pavlik, et.al. 1993)? In the for-profit
context, some authors suggest using the measure of company profits as a percentage of
sales, profit, market equity value, revenue, and firm size as a function of sales and
revenue (Deckop, 1988). Others focus solely on the creation of shareholder value
through stock prices. However, how to measure economic value is in dispute (Bacidore,
et. al., 1997).
In a meta-analysis of 105 executive compensation studies that attempted to find a
link between pay, firm size, and performance, Tosi, Werner, Katz, and Gomez-Mejia
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(1997) found four main determinants of for-profit executive salaries: absolute firm size,
changes in firm size, financial performance, and changes in financial performance
(Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman, 1997). However, other factors may influence executive
wages.
Ezzamel and Watson (1998) suggest that CEO's are paid a market rate for their
labor. The challenge is in defining the market and identifying a "comparison other" as an
external point of reference. Peer compensation, using comparable roles as a measure,
effects CEO pay.
A dominant theoretical formulation for executive compensation studies is agency
theory. An agency problem arises when an actor, the principal, enlists the services of
another, an agent, to operate on behalf of the principal in decision-making (Ross, 1973).
The problem assumes conflict between the goals of the principal and agent and
information asymmetry where the principal cannot, or without incurring great expense,
monitor the activities of the agent. Additionally, the principal and agent may have
different risk preferences resulting in a lack of alignment in decision-making (Eisenhardt,
1989). A firm's ownership structure influences executive compensation.
Firm governance is not limited to the influence of the board of directors.
Governance includes the effects of the media and the public writ large, remuneration
committees, and the market for corporate control (Barkema and Gomez-Mejia, 1998).
When persons from outside the firm are in the majority of those serving on a
compensation committee or board of directors, salaries are comparably lower (Conyon
and Peck, 1998).
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An explanation for salary determinants is also found in human capital theory.
Human capital has been used to explain the relationship between salary levels and firm
size because human capital attributes are needed to manage larger and more complex
organizations (Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman, 1997). Human capital refers to an
individual’s capacity to produce and perform tasks (Schultz, 1962). Human capital
theory stands on the proposition that people enhance their capabilities through selfinvestment. Consequently, earning differentials reflect those payoffs to investments in
human capital. Spence (1973) asserts that human capital serves as a signal in the job
market potentially predicting productivity.
In contrast, personal characteristics like age, race, and gender are not subject to
manipulation. Although both human capital and personal characteristics transmit
information to employers that speak to desirability as employees, they are not the same.
Spence (1973) views human capital as signals and personal characteristics as indices.
Employees employ a signaling strategy as they make decisions about self-enhancement.
Indices are a given which are also taken into consideration by employers. The difference
between signals and indices is that human capital is alterable, while indices are
unchangeable factors.
According to Becker (1962), there are several ways to invest in human capital
including education and job experience. In his treatment of on-the-job-training, Becker
differentiates between general training and specific training. General training increases
the marginal productivity of the trainee for many firms, not only for the firm that
provided the training. Specific training favors the organization that administers the
training. Becker observes that most training is neither completely general nor completely
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specific. Whether the training is specific or general, it benefits strong monopsonists
because laborers have fewer alternative employment opportunities under monopsony.
Becker’s analysis of specific training has several implications. There is the risk of
labor turnover for firms even in monopsonistic labor markets. In order to reduce the risk,
Becker asserts that rational firms will pay higher wages to employees after it has trained
them as a means of sharing on the return from training and as an effort to retain trained
workers. Generally trained employees will continue to receive lower wages than
specifically trained workers. Employees with specific training would be less likely to
quit and employers would be less likely to dismiss them.
Weisbrod (1962) observes a strong positive relationship between earning levels
and education. He also notes the benefits of receiving additional education. A person
with education beyond high school also has expanded employment options. In addition
to more job choices, Weisbrod claims that an educated person will seek employment with
non-pecuniary rewards and may sacrifice monetary compensation.
2.3 Nonprofit Executive Compensation Research
The role of a ministerial leader of a church parish is analogous to the job of an
executive director of a nonprofit. Aside from the religious aspect, the organization is a
mission-maximizing nonprofit. Nonprofit wage research, therefore, is applicable and
contributes to the development of our theory of clergy executive compensation.
Young (1984) analyzed nonprofit wages, addressing the following research
questions. 1) Is there a substantial difference in nonprofit compensation between sectors?
What accounts for the differences? 2) Are the sectoral differences substantial for different
classes of employees? Young found that nonprofit workers are paid less than their
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counterparts generally speaking. However, within industries, the evidence is mixed
suggesting other factors at work.
Weisbrod (1983) studied the pay differential between nonprofit and for-profit
lawyers. He concluded that nonprofit lawyers have different preference structures that
lead them to accept substantially lower wages than their equally qualified for-profit
counterparts. Weisbrod’s finding supports the “donative labor hypothesis” where the
good produced is perceived to be different or of higher quality than the comparable forprofit good; therefore, the worker is willing to donate the cost of labor in exchange for
participating in a noble enterprise of greater public benefit (Leete, 2006). Weisbrod was
the first to support a commonly held notion that nonprofit workers will do similar work
as persons in a for-profit context at a discount.
Preston (1989) came to a similar conclusion stating that nonprofit workers
seeking to provide goods with positive externalities will accept lower wages. Oster
(1998), drawing upon the work of Young (1984), concurred by asserting that nonprofits
provide non-monetary benefits to workers in lieu of financial compensation. However,
Leete (2001) found only slight differences in wages across the economy between forprofit and nonprofit workers. Other scholars found that nonprofit salaries are comparable
with market wages while apparent differences exist, however, at the occupational and
industry level (Ruhm and Borkowski, 2003).
Wage differentials can also be partially explained by the theory of compensating
differentials (Leete, 2006). According to the theory, workers who have specialized skills,
skills that are complex or expensive to attain, or who work under undesirable conditions
will earn more. On the other hand, those workers with easily attained skills and

28

preferable working conditions will earn less. Comparisons of nonprofit and for-profit
wages that do not take into account the differences in industry, occupation, or the
characteristics of individual workers, tend to report that nonprofit workers earn less than
for-profit workers (Leete, 2006).
Nonprofit executive compensation research, summarized in Table A.3 (see
Appendix A), suggests several factors that contribute to executive salaries. Most scholars
propose that organizational size is important (Oster, 1998; Frumkin and Keating, 2001;
Twombly and Gantz, 2001; Hallock, 2002; Gray and Benson, 2003); however, the
measures of size vary. Most scholars use assets as a measure of size. Some use total
assets (Oster, 1998; Frumkin and Keating, 2001; Twombly and Gantz, 2001; Gray and
Benson, 2003) while others use net assets (Hallock, 2002).
Organizational complexity also positively impacts executive salaries (Gray and
Benson, 2003; Twombly and Harvey, 2007). Twombly and Harvey (2007) measure
organizational complexity by revenue diversification. Research suggests that
organizations that operate with multiple revenue streams may be more administratively
and financially complex than groups that rely on single funding sources (Gronbjerg
1993). Gray and Benson (2003) utilize total assets as a proxy for organizational
complexity assuming that larger organizations are more complex.
Financial strength and variability in revenue streams is also a strong determinant
according to researchers (Oster, 1998; Frumkin and Keating 2001; Twombly and Gantz,
2001; Krishnan, Yetman, and Yetman 2006; Twombly and Harvey, 2007). Some
scholars believe that fiscal health ratios are important in the nonprofit sector as signals to
stakeholders of organizational viability and sustainability (Tuckman and Chang, 1991;
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Greenlee and Trussel, 2000; Trussel 2002).1 Therefore, an organization with strong
financial indicators will reward the executive leader accordingly.
An organization that is more dependent on private donations, rather than public
funding or fees, will have lower salaries because of board concerns over public image
and stakeholder concerns over the diversion of resources (Oster, 1998). Twombly and
Gantz (2001) observe that in the religious, environmental, and higher education
organizations, a greater dependency on charitable donations decreases salaries perhaps as
a signal of fiscal restraint to donors. In the presence of monitoring mechanisms
administered by the grantor, organizations receiving government grants receive more pay
(Hallock, 2002).
Some researchers suggest that executives are rewarded in accordance with
measures that assess how well the nonprofit achieves its mission (Baber, Daniel, and
Roberts, 2002; Krishnan, Yetman, and Yetman 2006). Positive revenue increases are a
signal of mission attainment (Krishnan, Yetman, and Yetman 2006). Baber, Daniel, and
Roberts (2002) found that the changes in executive compensation are positively affected
by the changes in the amounts spent on programs and the degree to which the programs
are monitored by an oversight agency.
Other scholars have studied a link between pay and performance in nonprofit
executive compensation (Gray and Benson, 2003; Twombly and Harvey, 2007; Mesch
and Rooney, 2008). Mesch and Rooney (2008) studied nonprofit fundraisers and found a
strong positive pay for performance link as measured by the revenues garnered for the
organization. In contrast, Harvey and Twombly (2007), who measured performance

1

These studies address financial health apart from executive compensation.
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using financial indicators, found the financial measures had little impact on executive
wages.
Cultural factors within a given context impact the size of the CEO pay package
(Oster, 1998; Gray and Benson, 2003). Oster (1998) found that religious affiliation
reduces executive salaries. Gray and Benson observe that nonprofit executives at small
business development centers related to college campuses earned less than their
colleagues serving centers without a campus affiliation.
Other scholars argue that human capital factors and personal characteristics like
gender, education, and experience affect compensation levels (Oster, 1998; Gray and
Benson, 2003). Although not significant, the negative coefficient associated with female
executives across nonprofit organizations was suggestive for Oster (1998). Gray and
Benson (2003) found education and tenure to be positively significant in their study.
2.4 Clergy Compensation Studies
Operational formulas and available resources used to determine clergy
compensation vary as much as congregations and churches (Arnold, 1991; Schuchmann,
2000). According to a 1999 survey on church budgets, 70 percent of the clergy
interviewed felt that they were fairly compensated, while 30 percent felt they were
underpaid (Schuchmann, 2000). That study also suggested variations based on the size of
the church or congregation as well as location where pastors of large membership
churches in urban areas were paid more.
Denominational standards, cost of living, transportation and automobile expenses,
insurance, clothing allowances, and continuing education all affect salary levels (Arnold,
1991). Average income of congregational families is also used as a benchmark to
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determine appropriate clergy packages (Arnold, 1991). Congregational documents to
guide clergy compensation are available such as The Annual Compensation Handbook
for Church and Staff (Schuchmann, 2000). However, there are very few empirical
studies focusing on the salaries of ministers.
Scholars have attempted to explain clergy compensation through various
theoretical models, such as agency theory, denomination-specified labor markets,
promotion tournaments, and free labor markets (Trawick and Lile, 2007; Zech, 2007;
Haney, 2008). Table A.2, in Appendix A, summarizes the research on clergy executive
compensation. Researchers studying the wages of clergy suggest that the key factors are:
size, market factors, personal characteristics, human capital, congregational wealth,
performance, and denominational affiliation (McMillan and Price, 2001; McMillan and
Price, 2003; Trawick and Lile, 2007; Graham, 2007; Zech, 2007; Haney, 2008).
Denominational affiliation and education exhibited mixed results as factors affecting
clergy salaries (McMillan and Price, 2001; Trawick and Lile, 2007; Zech, 2008; Haney,
2007).
The measures of size vary from congregational membership (Mcmillan and Price,
2001; Trawick and Lile, 2007; Zech, 2007) to worship attendance (McMillan and Price,
2003; Haney, 2008). The market variables examined have been community size
(Trawick and Lile, 2007; Zech, 2007), open vs. closed labor market due to congregational
polity (McMillan and Price, 2003; Zech, 2007; Haney, 2008), and the degree of
competition among denominations (Trawick and Lile, 2007).
The human capital and personal characteristic variables examined include race
(McMillan and Price, 2003), gender (McMillan and Price, 2003; Graham, 2007; Zech,
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2007), education (Perl and Chang, 2000; McMillan and Price, 2003), and experience
(McMillan and Price, 2003; Zech, 2007). Lummis (2003) and Dart (2004) include
marital status as a personal characteristic determinant suggesting that congregations
prefer their clergy to be younger, male, and married. This is not a discriminatory attitude
independent of job performance. For instance, congregations may be willing to pay a
premium to a clergyperson who can potentially attract young families. Additionally, the
spouse may be expected to take on volunteer duties.
Congregational wealth has been measured by laity average income (McMillan and
Price, 2003), the cost of living index for a given geographic area (Trawick and Lile,
2007), and the church budget (Graham, 2007; Trawick and Lile, 2007). The performance
measures that were investigated that affect clergy salaries are: the ability to manage a
budget (Zech, 2007), supervision of clergy (Zech, 2007), and new members (Trawick and
Lile, 2007).
Zech (2007) tests the agency relationship empirically. He assumes that clergy are
risk and effort averse and that in order to manage the principal-agent relationship risk
neutral churches adopt a pay-for-performance model of compensation. Zech finds a
weak relationship between performance, operationalized by clergy activity measures
(preaching, teaching, visitation, etc.), and clergy compensation.
The most significant results for Zech (2007) are those associated with promotion
tournaments, where clergy compete for wages and increase their salaries through
“promotions” by moving to larger, more prestigious, congregations with more
responsibility. The promotion tournament variables are: number of clergy supervised,
membership size, and size of community. Perl and Chang (2000) agree with Zech in
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regards to clergy supervision as they observe that supervising others may also lead to
increased compensation for clergy as secular norms of professionalization are exhibited
in churches.
One of the dominant analytical lenses for examining clergy executive
compensation is clergy labor markets. A labor market is the arena where workers
exchange their labor for pecuniary and non-pecuniary rewards (Kalleberg and Sørensen,
1979). There exists both a supply and demand-side for clergy labor.

Clergy Labor
Market
(Supply-Side)

Calling

Credentialing

Commissioning

Harvey (2010)

Figure 2.2 Clergy Labor Market Supply-Side

The supply-side of the clergy labor market is illustrated in Figure 2.2. Clergy
enter the labor market by the expression of receiving a supernatural "calling" (Niebuhr,
1977; Oden, 1983; Campbell, 1988; Perl and Chang, 2000). This calling is similar to the
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public-service motivation found in public service workers (Bright, 2009). Queuing
theory (Reskin and Roos, 1990) suggests that workers rank jobs in terms of a job queue
where the most desirable jobs are at the top. As such, ministerial work is high on the job
queue for persons entering the ministry (Chang and Bompadre, 1999). Ministers then
enter into some form of credentialing process (e.g. licensing, seminary education, or
ordination) where their gifts (perceived skills necessary for ministerial success) are
affirmed, legitimizing their calling and making them suitable for deployment into the
parish, as illustrated in Figure 2.2 (Niebuhr, 1977).

Clergy Labor
Market
(Demand-Side)

Open
Clergy Labor
Market

Closed
Clergy Labor
Market

Autonomous
Congregational
Non-Hierarchical
Churches

Affiliated
Connectional
Hierarchical
Churches

Segmented Market
Stratified Market
Dual Labor Market

Primary
Sector
Jobs

Segmented Market
Stratified Market
Dual Labor Market

Secondary
Sector
Jobs

Primary
Sector
Jobs

Secondary
Sector
Jobs
Harvey (2010)

Figure 2.2 Clergy Labor Market Demand-Side

The demand-side of the clergy labor market is comprised of the congregation or
denominational/ecclesial structure as seen in Figure 2.3. Researchers suggest that two
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labor market structures exist depending on whether a congregation or church operates
autonomously or under a hierarchical structure of centralized governance (Trawick and
Lile, 2007; Haney, 2008). Bonifield and Mills (1980) categorize the autonomous and
hierarchic markets of alternative denominations as competitive or monopolistic. Scholars
also include a third "mixed" labor market where clergy salaries are determined at the
intersection of free market and hierarchical mandates, e.g. Zech (2007).
Autonomous denominations are loosely linked congregations with no formal
hierarchical governance (e.g., various Baptist and Pentecostal denominations). In
contrast, hierarchical denominations operate as a single body with significant centralized
governance at the top. Hierarchical denominations include the Methodist, Lutheran,
Episcopalian, and Presbyterian denominations (Haney, 2008).
Such variety in church governance suggests various degrees of asymmetrical
bargaining power among pastors and congregations and denominations. In cases where a
denomination has a higher degree of centralized authority, as in the case of hierarchical
denominations, pastors and congregations have less bargaining power than the
denomination. In autonomous denominations, the congregations have more bargaining
power than the denomination and the pastors because the denomination cannot enforce its
wishes on the churches and the pastors serve at the behest of the congregation.
The imbalance in the power dynamic as it relates to employee / employer
negotiations is attributed to the monopsonistic nature of the labor markets for ministers
(Chang and Bompadre, 1999). Aside from serving as parish clergy, the employment
options for clerics are somewhat limited because of their firm specific or enterprise skills
(Althauser, 1989).
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Althauser (1989) defines an internal labor market as all jobs within a firm but also
includes occupational labor markets across firms. Denominational clergy find
themselves in an internal or insular labor market as they affiliate with a specific religious
body and exempt themselves from the open clergy labor market (Chang and Bompadre,
1999). For example, clergy serve churches that reflect the religious orientation of the
ministers. It is rare for a Presbyterian minister to serve a Methodist church. Ministers
may transfer into another denomination that recognizes the ordination of the minister.
However, there are educational requirements as to theology and doctrine before doing so.
Generally, once clergypersons are in a denominational labor pool, they limit themselves
to the insular denominational market.
Perl and Chang (2000) examine the degree to which education is used to create a
stratified labor market and the effects of education on the earnings of clergywomen.
These authors found that seminary degrees positively affect salaries more strongly in
theologically conservative denominations that do not generally require such education
than in liberal denominations. Female clergy receive lower returns on their Masters of
Divinity in denominations that require seminary education than clergywomen in
denominations without the seminary requirement. In congregations that are autonomous,
having the ability to hire their own pastor and having clergy who graduated from a
university affiliated seminary increased earnings.
Within the United Methodist Church, there is a Commission on Equitable
Compensation in each Annual Conference (Olsen, 2008). The purpose of the
commission is to make recommendations as to minimum salary levels for clergy
members of the annual conference. The salary levels correspond to the conference

37

relationship of the pastor. The conference relationship is determined by ordination status
as it relates to the North Georgia Conference.
The effect of the policy guidelines from the Equitable Compensation Commission
is consistent with dual, split, or segmented labor market theory (Kalleberg and Sørensen,
1979; Dickens and Lang, 1985, 1988). According to the theory, there is a difference in
the price of labor for performing the same work within two distinct sectors, a primary and
secondary job sector. Some scholars suggest further distinction between upper-tier and
lower tier jobs within the primary sector (Kalleberg and Sørensen, 1979).
This study suggests that the Equitable Compensation Commission, through its
policies, creates a stratified labor market for clergy where not all ministers compete with
each other for jobs equally. Ordination serves to distinguish persons as set apart for
clergy leadership within a church organization after undergoing a process of examination
and credentialing. Ordained clergy (ordained members of the North Georgia Annual
Conference) compete only with other ordained clergy while the non-ordained compete
with clergy who do not hold North Georgia ordination status.
Haney (2008) also suggests that there is some degree of variance within different
denominational hierarchical structures relative to influence over compensation and
benefits packages and pastoral assignment. The United Methodist denomination
possesses a more elaborate and highly structured hierarchy. As the largest hierarchical
denomination, its clergy labor pool is the most centrally regulated (Haney, 2008). The
United Methodist Church has a history of mandating minimum clergy compensation
levels. Regardless of the differences within hierarchical denominations, most follow
formalized denominational guidelines or mandates for clergy compensation.
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Haney (2008) found that intervention by denominational hierarchies in setting
clergy salaries raised the median salaries and benefits levels significantly, relative to the
free labor market for clergy. This result was consistent across denominational size. In
contrast to Haney (2008), Zech (2007) did not find significance related to denominational
affiliation. Specifically, United Methodist clergy fared no better than comparable clergy
of other denominations.
McMillan and Price (2003) expanded their 2001 study of Protestant clergy
salaries and studied market factors influencing salaries of Protestant and Catholic
ministers. They determined that clergy in larger Protestant churches, belonging to
denominations with a connectional polity (e.g. centralized control over the development
and assignment of clergy), and serving churches in urban areas, have higher salaries than
their Catholic colleagues. Additionally, they found that male Protestant clergy earn more
than female clergy, and white pastors are paid more than African American pastoral
leaders.
Trawick and Lile (2007) studied the labor market for Southern Baptist clergy in
seven Southern states to determine the effects of spatial concentration on salary. They
found that the greater the concentration of Southern Baptist churches in a particular
county, the higher the wages for Southern Baptist ministers. Conversely, a high
concentration of churches from other denominations had no perceivable effect on
Southern clergy salaries.
The main goal of this chapter was to survey the literature applicable to
understanding the factors that contribute to the salaries of clergy while providing a
conceptual framework for viewing churches as nonprofit organizations. The next chapter
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proposes the general framework for clergy executive compensation that provides a point
of departure to create an empirical model for the determinants of ministerial wages.
Additionally, the chapter establishes the basis for a theory and the testable hypotheses
associated with clergy salaries.
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CHAPTER THREE
METHODOLOGY AND DATA
Because the literature on clergy executive compensation is sparse, in both the
number of peer-reviewed studies and the number of studies using multivariate analysis,
an important contribution to knowledge would be to apply the studies of nonprofit
executive compensation to the case of executive clergy. Many of the clergy
compensation determinants are similar to the factors advanced by nonprofit executive
compensation research. The empirical analysis will include the testing of nonprofit
executive compensation, organizational, and labor market hypotheses on clergy salaries.

A General Framework for Clergy Executive Compensation
Human Capital
Education
Tenure
Experience
Ordination Status

Personal Characteristics
Age
Race
Gender
Marital Status

Organizational Elements

Compensation
Pecuniary
Non-Pecuniary

Membership Size
Financial Indicators
Governance Issues
Managerial Scope

Religious Market
Competition

Clergy Labor Market – Supply and Demand
Side
Calling
Autonomous v. Hierarchical Polity
Geography

Principal-Agent Relationship
Local Church’s Mission
Denominational Aims

Harvey (2010)

Figure 3.1 Clergy Executive Compensation Framework
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As a part of the analysis, following Barkema and Gomez-Mejia (1998), this
research proposes a general framework for clergy executive compensation in Figure 3.1.
The clergy compensation framework (CCF) is valuable because within the framework
there is the opportunity for theory development.
Ostrom (1999) describes frameworks as helping in identifying elements and
relationships that contribute to analysis. Frameworks organize the parameters of inquiry
by identifying and defining the variables that would be included in a theory of a
particular phenomenon. They provide the meta-theoretical language by which theories
can be compared and assist in generating the initial questions for analysis. In this case,
the CCF summarizes the factors identified in previous research, including nonprofit
executive compensation studies, found to influence executive clergy wages: human
capital, personal characteristics, organizational elements, the religious market, clergy
labor markets, and the agency relationship (principal-agent relationship).
This research models the determinants of pastor's salaries, as seen in the standard
single labor market wage model, with a log wage equation using ordinary least squares
regression where the natural logarithm of clergy total compensation in 2008 is the
dependent variable (Dickens and Lang, 1988; Leete, 2001). The natural logarithm of
clergy total compensation in 2008 is the dependent variable. By employing the natural
log of executive compensation, the beta coefficients on the explanatory variables are
interpreted as percentage changes in compensation.
Following previous scholars (Frumkin and Keating, 2001; Baber, Daniels, and
Roberts, 2002; Krishnan, Yetman, and Yetman, 2006) this investigation uses a lagged
model for some of the independent variables. The lagged model is appropriate because
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budgets for a given year are developed in advance. The consumer price index deflator is
also applied to the executive compensation figures in 2008 so that they and the 2007
financial data would be in comparable dollars.
One of the assumptions, pertaining to human capital2, contributing to the wage
equation suggests that the effect of human capital on wages shares a similar concaveshaped pattern as the wage earnings profile due to decreasing marginal rates of return
over time (Brown, 1989). Including quadratic specification (squared terms) for the
human capital variables age, tenure, experience and education, in the empirical model
accounts for the assumed curvilinear effects in the human capital earnings function.
Therefore, the general form of the model is:
lnCompensation t =

f{Human Capital t-1, Personal Characteristics t-1,
Organizational Elements t-1, Market Factors t-1, PrincipalAgent Factors t-1}

Previous nonprofit executive compensation research (Baber, Daniels, and
Roberts, 2002; Ruhm and Borkowski, 2003) assume an additive relationship between the
independent variables. Therefore, the additive specification for the general empirical
model is a multiple linear regression of the form:

3

lnCompensation 2008 = 0 + 1 Education 2007 + 2 Education squared 2007 +
3 Tenure 2007 + 4 Tenure squared 2007 + 5 Years of service 2007 +
6 Years of service squared 2007 + 7 Ordained + 8 Age 2007 +
2

Some researchers (Murphy, 1990) include age as part of human capital since age may serve as a proxy
measure for experience. However, in this study, age is described as a personal characteristic. Empirically,
age is treated with the addition of a squared term like the human capital variables.
3
See Table B2 for a description of the variables and their measures.
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9 Age squared 2007 + 10 Female + 11 Black + 12 Other race +
13 Married + 14 lnMembership2007 + 15 lnNet Assets 2007 + 16 Clergy
staff expense 2007 + 17 lnLay staff expense percentage 2007 +
18 Competition 2007 + 19 Urban location + 20 Suburban location +
21 lnWorship attendance 2007 + 22 Program expense 2007 +
23 lnApportionments paid 2007 + ε
3.1 Hypotheses
The first set of hypotheses relates to the agency relationship. The agency
relationship variables reflect the mission-related aims of the denomination and the
congregation respectively. The primary mission of the congregation is to maximize faith
adherents. Programmatic ministry and mission outside the confines of the church is also
a part of the work of many churches. The congregational mission is measured by using
worship attendance figures and program expenditures. Higher salaries, holding other
variables constant, are anticipated when pastors work to achieve the local church's
mission.
The mission-related goal of the denomination is to maximize apportionment
dollars (franchise fees / taxes) from the local churches. The apportionments are
calculated as a percentage of church total expenses (as indicated on the end of year
report) excluding capital expenses and programmatic ministry funds for self-supporting
ministries. The measure for the achievement of denominational aims is the amount of
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money paid in apportionments. In light of the agency relationship existing between
clergy and the respective congregation and the denomination, several hypotheses follow:4
Hypothesis 1: Ministerial wages will increase as clergy meet the missionrelated aims of the local church, measured by worship attendance
and program expense.
Hypothesis 2: Increases in the denominational mission variable, as measured by
the amount of money paid in apportionments, will increase
executive clergy wages.
The next set of hypotheses relates to congregational factors or organizational
elements. Under organizational elements, church membership, which measures
organizational size, and net assets, which measures fiscal health, are applied as control
variables. Managerial scope describes the elements embodied in administrating the
organization such as span of management and job complexity. The expenses associated
with compensating lay staff (as a percentage of total expenses) and the amount expended
for compensating associate ministers measures managerial scope since some ministers
supervise laity or other clergy as a part of their job portfolio. The organizational element
hypotheses are:
Hypothesis 3: Organizational size, as measured by church membership, is
positively associated with clergy salaries.
Hypothesis 4: Financially healthy congregations, as measured by net assets, will
pay their ministers more than their counterparts.
Hypothesis 5: An increase in the clergy staff expense, exclusive of the senior
pastor's salary, will increase clergy salaries.
Hypothesis 6: Executive clergy wages increase as the lay staff expense
percentage, as measured by the amount of money expended on lay
staff divided by total expenses, increases.

4

The research hypotheses are stated in terms of defining relationships when all other variables are held
constant.
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The human capital variables are: experience, education, tenure, and a
dichotomous variable ordination. The personal characteristic variables are: age, race,
gender, and marital status, a dichotomous variable. Under human capital and personal
characteristics, this investigation adds two additional determinants not found in the
empirical literature, marital status and ordination. How do clergy benefit from being
married? Congregations may be willing to pay a premium to a clergyperson who can
potentially attract young families. Additionally, the spouse may be expected to take on
volunteer duties.
This study also suggests that conference relationship, as defined by ordination
status, stratifies the clergy labor market. The upper-stratum is comprised of clergy who
are ordained members of the North Georgia Annual Conference of the United Methodist
Church. Ordination, which culminates the process of credentialing, bestows upon clergy
voting rights within the annual conference and guaranteed employment similar to tenure
in an academic setting. The lower-stratum is constituted by non-ordained clergy and
clergy who may hold ordination in other denominations or other Annual Conferences.
There is no empiricism suggesting that ordained clergy demonstrate increased job
productivity. Ordination benefits clergy by moving them into an elite group within the
Annual Conference. The expected effect on clergy salary from human capital and
personal characteristics follows:
Hypothesis 7: Increases in human capital, as measured by tenure, education, job
experience, and ordination status will result in an increase in
clergy salary.
Hypothesis 8: Personal characteristics, as measured by age and being married,
are positively associated with ministerial pay.
Hypothesis 9: Personal characteristics, as measured by being non-white and
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female, are negatively associated with executive clergy wages.
The present research also includes control variables representing the religious and
clergy labor markets as seen in Trawick and Lile (2007). The measure for the religious
market competition is the number of Christian denominated churches in a county. The
clergy market variables are the dichotomous variables urban and suburban indicating the
location of a church assignment. The market hypotheses are:
Hypothesis 10: Religious market competition will have no significant effect on
clergy salaries.
Hypothesis 11: Serving in an urban setting will result in comparably higher
clergy salaries.
This investigation also suggests that within the market strata established through
ordination, there will be different determinants depending upon which stratum is
investigated.
Hypothesis 12: The market strata, as defined by conference relationship through
ordination, will determine salary level for ministers. The higher a
minister's conference relationship, the more she/he will make in
compensation.
Hypothesis 13: The determinants of clergy compensation are strata specific.
There will be different factors determining clergy salaries for
different strata.
3.2 Data Description and Limitations
The data for the present study come from several sources. The church level data
come from the end of year reports of the local churches of the North Georgia Annual
Conference of the United Methodist Church for the years 2008 and 2007. The
Conference is comprised of over 1000 churches, 320,000 lay members, and 1500 clergy
(North Georgia Conference, The United Methodist Church, 2010). Local churches are
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required to file an annual report that includes information that describes the
congregations demographically and financially.

Districts of the North Georgia Annual Conference

http://www.ngumc.org/pages/detail/785 accessed on 2/1/2010

Figure 3.2 Districts of the North Georgia Annual Conference

The geographic bounds of the conference are illustrated in Figure 3.2. The
conference, located in the northern part of Georgia, is comprised of twelve districts
covering seventy counties spanning from the Alabama state line in the west to the South
Carolina border in the east and Tennessee in the north. Because the current study focuses
only on the salaries of pastors of local churches, the sample is restricted to clergy who
served as the lead pastor in 2007. Clergy who did not serve churches are omitted. In
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keeping with the analogy of the lead pastor as a nonprofit executive, associate ministers
are not included in the investigation.
Many studies on nonprofit executive compensation use the IRS 990 data found in
the National Nonprofit Research Database from the National Center for Charitable
Statistics. The organizational data in the present research is unique in that it addresses a
limitation found in the NCCS data. Frumkin and Keating (2001) note that the coded data
files from NCCS do not have labels to distinguish salaries of the executive directors from
other senior staff. As a result, researchers some times assume that the highest salary
corresponds to the executive director. The dataset used here specifically identifies the
senior executive’s compensation.
Table B.3 (Appendix B) summarizes the organizational and individual data. The
organizational data set includes 792 churches or charges. In cases where a number of
smaller churches have the same pastor the grouping of churches constitutes a church
charge. One of the purposes in clustering churches is to constitute an appointment that
meets the minimum salary guidelines for clergy. After extensive cleaning to eliminate
churches with no members and pastors with no salary, there are 568 usable observations.5
The average number of members in 2007 was 440 with an average weekly
worship attendance of 167 congregants. Clergy total compensation is comprised of a
base salary plus housing allowance, reimbursable cash allowance, and other cash
allowances (North Georgia Annual Conference, The United Methodist Church, 2007).
The mean clergy total compensation is $45,728.50. The average net assets for the
churches is $2.3 million.

5

Due to the limited number of observations for the education variable, when education is included there are
only 418 observations.
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A data set developed by the U.S. Department of Agriculture was used to establish
a set of dichotomous variables (urban/suburban/rural) for the seventy counties that
comprise the North Georgia Conference that may reflect differentials in the cost of living.
A market competition variable, which represents the number of competing churches in a
geographic area, was created by counting the number of churches in each county.
The individual level data set, provided by the Office of Data Services of the North
Georgia Annual Conference, describes the clergy leaders’ personal characteristics. The
data include the clergy demographic characteristics gender, age, race, marital status,
ordination status, and conference relationship.
Each clergyperson bears a particular relationship to the Annual Conference based
on North Georgia and United Methodist ordination status as seen in Table 3.1. There are
both ordained and non-ordained persons serving churches. The highest level in the
ordained ranks is Full Connection with two categories, Elder in Full Connection and
Deacon in Full Connection. Provisional members are those seeking admission to the
conference aspiring to be ordained members in Full Connection. Clergy may serve in an
active or retired relationship. Non-ordained persons include seminary students and local
pastors who may serve on a part-time or full-time basis. Additionally, there are persons
from denominations outside of the United Methodist Church, both ordained and nonordained, serving churches as they seek a transfer into the United Methodist clergy ranks
and admission to the North Georgia Conference.
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Table 3.1
Conference Relationship Categories
Clergy Classifications
Associate Member
Deacon in Full Connection*
Elder in Full Connection*
Full-time Local Pastor
Other Local Pastor
Associate Member of
Other Annual Conference
Elder Member of Other
Annual Conference
Full Member of Other
Denomination
Provisional Member of
Other Annual Conference
Provisional Elder*
Part-time Local Pastor
Student from other Annual
Conference/Denomination
serving as a Local Pastor
Supply Pastor

Frequency
6
1
407
28
1

Percentage
.80
.94
54.48
3.75
.13

0

0.00

13

1.74

15

2.01

1
37
215

.13
4.95
28.78

4
19

.54
2.54

747

100.00

Total
*Indicates Full Connection and Full Connection track

In order to acquire educational information, a survey was distributed to the clergy
members of the North Georgia Annual Conference who were serving as lead pastors in
churches in 2007. Individual clergy were contacted via phone and in person as follow-up
to the survey request.
The data have limitations. The population and the subsequent sample come from
one denomination, The United Methodist Church, in one geographic area, North Georgia.
Further, the data do not reveal the number of hours worked by any of the clergy.
In order to address the research question examining what factors contribute to
clergy salary levels, the full clergy compensation model is applied to the population
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sample and the hypotheses are tested. The next chapter provides the data analysis and the
results of the model.
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CHAPTER FOUR
RESULTS OF THE MODEL
This investigation addresses the research question: What are the determinants of
clergy executive compensation. The following sections provide a description of the
results and the analysis based on the previously stated research question and hypotheses
using two models: an overall clergy compensation model and the stratified clergy labor
market model (Dickens and Lang, 1988).6
4.1 Hypothesis Testing
Previously, this research proposed several hypotheses for testing the clergy
compensation framework. The clergy compensation model suggests that the
determinants of clergy compensation are: education, age, tenure, years of service as a
Methodist minister, ordination status, competition, membership size, the worship ratio,
net assets, the apportionment payment percentage, the lay staff expense percentage, the
agency variable, and revenue concentration. The hypotheses are evaluated by examining
both the sign and the significance of the independent variables. The following results are
from hypotheses concerning the principal-agent or agency relationship.

6

Some of the variables exhibit curvilinear aspects. The curvilinear coefficient represents the marginal rates
of change for the effect of the independent variables. When the independent variable's coefficient is
positive and the coefficient on the squared term is negative, the impact of the independent variable is
increasing at a decreasing rate. After the inflection point (peak), the influence of the independent variable
decreases at an increasing rate. If the coefficient on the independent variable is negative and the squared
term has a positive coefficient, the effect of the independent variable is decreasing at a decreasing rate, then
after reaching a trough, increases at an increasing rate. Figures B1 – B4, in Appendix B, present the graphs
for these variables and their inflection points. The graphs represent a bivariate relationship while the
inflection points reflect the multivariate relationship with compensation. The peaks and troughs are
calculated according to the formula –b1/2b2 where b1 equals the coefficient on the linear term and b2 is the
coefficient on the curvilinear or squared term. The effects on clergy compensation are interpreted around
the predicted value (an estimate of the mean value) of salary when the independent variables have a
particular value (Lewis, 2005).

53

4.1.1Hypothesis One
Achieving the mission-related aims of the church will positively impact the wages
of executive clergy according to hypothesis one. The worship attendance measure was
significantly positive, while program expense was significantly negative in partial
support of hypothesis one as seen in Table 4.1. A one percent increase in the number of
worshippers corresponds to a .32% increase in ministerial wages. As the amount of
money expended for ministry programs increases by one thousand dollars, clergy salary
decreases by .091% suggesting a competition between dollars expended for wages and
programmatic dollars.

Table 4.1
Results of the Congregational Mission Test
Variable

Compensation
Model

Average Worship

0.32***

Attendance 2007

(0.0430)

(logged)
Program expense

-0.00091***

(per thousand $)

(0.00032)

Observations

418

R-squared

.84

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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4.1.2 Hypothesis Two
In hypothesis two, this research suggests that clergy salaries are positively
impacted by an increase in the denominational mission variable, as measured by the
amount of funds paid in apportionments. Table 4.2 shows that a one percent increase in
apportionment funds paid results in a .045% increase in clergy salary consistent with
study expectations. These results illustrate that a clergyperson who successfully
navigates the "dual agency" tension between the congregation and the denomination,
benefits financially.

Table 4.2
Results of the Denominational Mission Test
Variable

Compensation
Model

Apportionments

0.045**

paid ($)

(0.019)

(logged)
Observations

418

R-squared

.84

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The next set of results comes from testing the impact of organizational elements on
clergy wages.
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4.1.3 Hypothesis Three
Hypothesis three predicts that the number of church members has a positive
impact on ministerial wages. As seen in Table 4.3, a one percent increase in membership
size is related to a salary increase of .072%. This result is consistent with the expectation
in hypothesis three.

Table 4.3
Results of the Organizational Size Test
Variable

Compensation
Model

Church Membership

0.072*

(logged)

(0.0066)

Observations

418

R-squared

.84

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

4.1.4 Hypothesis Four
As seen in Table 4.4, net assets is positive and significant supporting the
hypothesis regarding financial health. The results suggest that wages increase by .12%
when net assets increases by one percent.
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Table 4.4
Results of the Financial Health Test
Variable

Compensation
Model

Net Assets

0.12***

(logged)

(0.021)

Observations

418

R-squared

.84

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

4.1.5 Hypothesis Five
Managerial scope also impacts clergy compensation as suggested by hypotheses
five through eight. A one thousand dollar increase in the amount expended to
compensate clergy staff is associated with a .034% decrease in the wages of the lead
minister as seen in Table 4.5. The decrease in salary, though small, suggests that
additional clergy are not viewed as adding to the supervisory responsibility of a senior
pastor, but rather as a co-laborer reducing the workload of the lead minister.
Alternatively, the decrease reflects a competition between dollars for the salary of the
lead minister and the salaries of associate ministers.
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Table 4.5
Results of Managerial Scope Test I
Variable

Compensation
Model

Clergy staff expense

-0.00034

(per thousand $)

(0.00038)

Observations

418

R-squared

.84

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

4.1.6 Hypothesis Six
The lay staff percentage also positively impacts executive clergy wages. Table
4.6 illustrates that a one percentage point increase in the lay staff expense percentage
corresponds to a 3.2% higher salary for clergy, in contrast to the effect of adding
additional associate minister expenses. The result suggests that, within the church,
supervising lay staff is associated with added managerial responsibility and is
compensated accordingly.
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Table 4.6
Results of Managerial Scope Test II
Variable

Compensation
Model

Lay staff expense

0.032*

percentage

(0.0195)

Observations

418

R-squared

.84

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

4.1.7 Hypothesis Seven
How does human capital impact the wages of ministers? Increases in certain
human capital factors correspond to higher salaries according to hypothesis seven. The
results in Table 4.7 provide partial support for hypothesis seven. An additional year of
education corresponds to a 60% decrease in clergy wage. Due to the curvilinear behavior
of education in this sample, where the effect of an additional year of education does not
benefit clergy until 21years, this result suggests that within an educated population
additional education does not benefit an individual significantly until that individual's
level of education clearly distinguishes that minister from other clergy.7

7

The inflection point for education is 20.6 years and the mean is 19.4 years. In an alternative specification
of the model, omitting the variable ordained, education becomes positive but loses significance.
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Table 4.7
Results of Human Capital Test
Variable

Compensation
Model

Education

-0.60***

(years past high

(0.20)

school)

Tenure 2007

0.032***

(in present

(0.010)

assignment)

Years of service
2007

0.0060

(as Methodist

(0.0053)

minister)

Ordination

0.68***
(0.14)

Observations

418

R-squared

.84

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Tenure in one's current assignment benefits clergy with a 3.2% increase in salary
for each additional year up to 11.6 years. Ordination corresponds to a 68% increase in
salary. Years of service, as a Methodist minister, has no significant impact on clergy
salary in this sample.
4.1.8 Hypothesis Eight
Hypothesis eight, which offers propositions regarding the effect of personal
characteristics on clergy compensation, is partially supported by the empirical results.
Age positively and significantly impacts executive clergy wages. An additional year of
age is associated with a 3.3% increase in salary up to 43.7 years of age. Being married
has no significant impact.

Table 4.8
Results of Personal Characteristics Test I
Variable

Compensation
Model

Age

0.033***
(0.011)

Marital status

-0.030
(0.043)

Observations

418

R-squared

.84

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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4.1.9 Hypothesis Nine
The results in Table 4.9 suggest that race and gender do not significantly impact
clergy salary. The negative coefficients are merely suggestive. These results do not
uphold hypothesis nine.

Table 4.9
Results of Personal Characteristics Test II
Variable

Compensation
Model

Black

-0.048
(0.041)

Other race

-0.036
(0.079)

Female

-0.018
(0.039)

Observations

418

R-squared

.84

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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4.1.10 Hypothesis Ten
The findings in Table 4.10 support hypothesis ten. Religious market competition
has no significant impact on clergy wages. What explains the lack of significance?
Churches may draw members from areas outside of their own county. Churches in the
same county may not participate in the same religious marketplace.

Table 4.10
Results of Religious Market Competition Test
Variable

Compensation
Model

Competition

-0.0000097
(0.00015)

Observations

418

R-squared

.84

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

4.1.11 Hypothesis Eleven
The results in Table 4.11 suggest that clergy serving churches in urban settings
make 11.2% more than their rural counterparts receive in wages. Serving a suburban
church does not significantly affect clergy salaries. These results uphold hypothesis
eleven.
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Table 4.11
Results of Clergy Labor Market Test
Variable

Compensation
Model

Urban

0.11**
(0.046)

Suburban

0.019
(0.040)

Observations

418

R-squared

.84

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

4.1.12 Hypothesis Twelve
Hypothesis twelve proposes that ordination stratifies the labor market where the
higher the ordination status, the higher the salary. The conference relationship, as
measured by ordination, positively and significantly impacts clergy compensation as seen
in Table 4.7 where ordained ministerial wages are 68% higher than the wages of
comparable non-ordained ministers.
4.1.13 Hypothesis Thirteen
Hypothesis thirteen is tested by a set of comparative models. The first model
represents the clergy compensation model applied only to upper-stratum clergy (persons
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who are ordained members of the North Georgia Annual Conference). Lower-stratum
clergy (persons who are serving as pastors but are not ordained members of the North
Georgia Annual Conference) in the sample are examined in the second model.
Regrettably, due to the lack of availability of data, education is removed from the
previous model used for testing hypotheses one through twelve.

Table 4.12
Determinants of Clergy Executive Compensation Ordained vs. Non-ordained Clergy8
Upper-Stratum
Clergy
Model
0.029***
(0.011)
0.012**
(0.0055)

Significant
Variables
Tenure
Years of Service 2007
Ordained
Age

Lower-Stratum
Clergy
Model

0.036***
(0.013)

Black
Average Membership 2007
(logged)
Net Assets
(logged)
Lay Staff Expense Percentage

0.13***
(0.046)
0.040***
(0.011)
0.046**
(0.02)
0.12**
(0.047)
0.31***
(0.045)
-0.0010***
(0.00034)

Urban Location
Average Worship Attendance
(logged)
Program Expense
(per thousand $)
Amount of Apportionments ($)
(logged)
Observations
R-squared

413
0.82

0.17*
(0.088)

0.28***
(0.098)
0.23***
(0.61)
155
0.63

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

8

The full results of the comparison model are found in Figure B.6 in Appendix B.
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Hypothesis thirteen is confirmed in the results found in Table 4.12 which
summarizes the significant variables identified by the regression analysis that determine
clergy compensation levels in each model. In addition to assuming clergy function in a
stratified labor market, hypothesis thirteen proposes that the determinants of clergy
compensation are dependent on the stratum level in which a clergyperson functions. In
other words, variables that demonstrate influence when applied to ordained clergy may
not exhibit the same type of influence for non-ordained clergy.
Hypothesis thirteen is further tested by using interaction terms with the
dichotomous variable ordained to determine if the variables applied in the ordained
clergy model, have the same effect when applied to non-ordained ministers. Interaction
terms for each of the independent variables are created then executed using the test
command in Stata. The results in Table 4.13 show how ordination affects the other
independent variables.9 The coefficients on the interaction terms are interpreted as the
difference of differences where the independent variable impacts clergy wages by an
additional (or reduced) amount by virtue of ordination.
Significant differences are exhibited for tenure, age, and the amount of
apportionments paid in the interaction terms model. An additional year of tenure benefits
ordained clergy by 6.5% more than non-ordained clergy. The wages of ordained clergy
increase by 5.2% more than the wages of non-ordained clergy with an additional year of
age. Paying apportionments benefits lower-stratum clergy more than ministers in the
upper-stratum. Ordained clergy receive .20% less in wages than non-ordained clergy
receive when associated with a one percent increase in the amount of apportionments
paid.
9

The full results of the interaction model are exhibited in Figure B7 in Appendix B.
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Table 4.13
Results of the Interaction Terms Test
Variable

Compensation
Model
Tenure
0.065***
(0.022)
Tenure squared
-0.0029***
(0.0011)
Years of Service
-0.0171
0.017
Years of Service
0.00071
squared
0.00052
Age
0.052**
(0.020)
Age squared
-0.00056***
(0.00020)
Female
0.024
0.084
Black
0.11
0.094
Other race
-0.14
(0.246)
Married
-0.12
0.097
Membership
-0.042
(logged)
0.085
Net Assets
0.019
0.050
Clergy Staff Expense
-0.012
(per thousand $)
0.017
Lay Staff Expense
0.0060
Percentage
0.040
Competition
0.000536
0.00046
Urban
0.081
0.10
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4.13
Results of the Interaction Terms Test (continued)
Suburban

0.12
(0.0933)
0.028
0.091
0.0039
0.0086
-0.20***
(0.052)

Worship Attendance
(logged)
Program Expense
(per thousand $)
Amount of
Apportionment
Paid (logged)
Observations

568

R-squared

.86

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The summary of the comparative model is as follows:
4.1.14 Human Capital Effects
Tenure only benefits upper-stratum clergy, where an additional year of tenure
corresponds to a 2.9% increase in salary. Ordained clergy are positively impacted by
additional years of experience. Upper-stratum clergy wages increase by 1.2% with an
additional year of experience.
4.1.15 Personal Characteristics Effects
Age also benefits the upper-stratum clergy. Ministerial wages increase by 2.3%
as age increases by one year for ordained clergy.
4.1.16 Religious Market Effects
Religious market competition has no significant impact on clergy salaries in either
of the models.
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4.1.17 Clergy Labor Market Effects
Upper-stratum clergy benefit from serving in an urban setting. Serving a church
in an urban location is associated with a 12% increase in wages compared to clergy
serving in rural areas. A plausible explanation for the higher wage is that ordained clergy
are more likely to serve larger and wealthier congregations located in urban areas
4.1.18 Organizational Elements Effects
Membership size is positively significant in both models. When membership
increases by one percent, ordained clergy experience a .13% wage benefit. Non-ordained
clergy increase their salaries by .17% when associated with a membership increase of one
percent.
Net assets is positively significant for ordained clergy. A one percent increase in
net assets is related to a .10% increase in salary for upper-stratum clergy. These results
suggest that clergy would have to demonstrate significant financial managerial acumen to
receive a higher wage illustrating the difference between for-profit and non-profit reward
systems.
As the lay staff expense percentage increases by one percentage point, ordained
clergy experience a 4.6% salary increase.
4.1.19 Principal-Agent Effects
In both models, worship attendance demonstrates a significant positive impact. A
.31% wage increase for ordained clergy is associated with a one percent increase in
worship attendance. Non-ordained clergy receive a wage increase of .31% when worship
attendance increases by one percent. Program expense is negatively significant in the
first model where upper-stratum clergy experience a .10% decrease in wages as the
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programmatic expenditures increase by one thousand dollars. A one percent increase in
the amount paid in apportionments is associated with a .23% wage increase for lower
stratum clergy.
4.2 Summary
The results of the analysis move us closer toward a theory of clergy executive
compensation. What are the determinants of clergy executive compensation according to
the analysis? The results suggest that the determinants of ministerial wages are:
education, tenure, conference relationship as measured by ordination, age, membership
size, net assets, lay staff expenses, urban location, worship attendance, program expenses,
and the amount paid in apportionments.
Ministers operate within a dual agency tension between the denomination and the
local church. While the worship attendance and program expenditures represents
attaining the goals of the local church, this research assumes that faithfulness in paying
apportionments exemplifies satisfying the preferences of the denomination. The analysis
shows that clergy who can accomplish both the mission-related aims of the local
congregation and the denominational hierarchy will benefit financially.
Ordination status is an integral determinant not found in previous studies and
accounts significantly for the differences. Ordination stratifies the labor market
distinguishing ordained clergy from their counterparts. Ordination signals commitment
to the denomination. Ordination is rewarded because clergy have agreed to restrict their
opportunities to the monopsony of the denomination rather than competing against the
denomination by exiting to work for a competing denomination or starting their own
church.
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The determinants of executive wages for ordained clergy are: tenure experience,
membership size, net assets, lay staff percentage, urban location, worship attendance, and
program expense. While the factors that contribute to clergy compensation for nonordained ministers are: membership size, worship attendance, and the amount paid in
apportionments. The determinants for ordained clergy are more closely aligned to the
clergy compensation framework proposed in this study which takes into account factors
omitted from previous nonprofit compensation research (e.g. labor markets). In contrast,
the elements that contribute to the wages of non-ordained clergy are similar to the factors
from previous non-profit executive compensation literature, size, and mission.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CLERGY COMPENSATION THEORY, DISCUSSION, AND CONCLUSION
5.1 United Methodist Clergy Appointment System
Clergy executive compensation in the present study is understood by applying a
variant of principal-agent theory, dual agency, where United Methodist clergy are agents
of two principals, the bishop, as representative of the denomination, and the local church.
As dual agents, ministerial leaders are compelled to fulfill the mission-related objectives
of both the local church and the denomination. Figure 5.1 illustrates the elements in the
appointive process that contribute to job placement and the associated salary.

Bishop

TopTop-Tier
Churches
UpperUpper-Stratum
Yes

Churches

Conference
Relationship

LowerLower-Tier
Churches

Ordained
No

Clergy

LowerLower-Stratum
Churches

Harvey (2010)

Figure 5.1 United Methodist Appointment Diagram
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The bishop receives information on the labor pool and the available church
assignments annually from the district superintendents who serve as supervisors for the
clergy. The information regarding the clergy labor pool comes from the individual
characteristics of the minister, the organizational factors from the present assignment, the
market for clergy placement in terms of the next assignment, and the clergy's
performance as informed by their annual evaluation.
The bishop appoints clergy to churches according to the Equitable Compensation
guidelines adopted each year by each Annual Conference. The recommendations create a
floor for clergy salaries according to their conference relationship as defined by
ordination status. The policies, as illustrated in Figure 5.1, also serve to create a system
of internal labor markets, through segmentation and stratification, where all clergy do not
compete equally with all other clergy in an annual conference, as suggested by the
present study. Dual labor market theory proposes that even within primary sector jobs,
those jobs that pay the most and afford opportunities for advancement and job
satisfaction, further stratification may be present (Kalleberg and Sørensen, 1979).
Salary guidelines from the Annual Conference are viewed more as suggestions
than binding agreements. After the initial appointment to a church, the Staff Parish
Relations Committee determines the clergy salary which then receives approval by the
governing board or church council (Olsen, 2008).
The Staff Parish Relations Committee is a committee within the local church
responsible for interpreting the mission and ministry of the United Methodist Church to
the local church body. In addition, the committee functions as a human resources
department that provides oversight for recruiting, evaluating, retaining, and releasing lay
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staff. The Staff Parish Relations committee is also the group that evaluates clergy and
makes recommendations regarding reappointment (retention) or reassignment (release).
Because clergy are appointed for terms of only one year, the dual agency relationship
creates a dyadic tension.
5.2 Discussion and Conclusion
This research began by challenging the notion that churches are uniquely
dissimilar to other organizations. In spite of their roots in religiosity, sectarian
organizations are in many ways analogous to firms that function in a given market and
seek to achieve their stated aims. In the present study, churches are characterized as
mission-maximizing nonprofits operating in a religious market. As such, previous
research in organizational theory, labor market economics, and nonprofit studies are
appropriate when applied to churches and their clergy leadership in advancing a theory of
clergy executive compensation. After applying the clergy compensation framework, this
investigation found that clergy salaries are influenced in part by personal characteristics,
human capital, organizational elements, labor market factors, and clergy performance.
The present research adds to the nonprofit executive compensation literature by
empirically testing for "dual agency", labor market stratification, and managerial scope.
Although there are several caveats before one attempts to generalize the results of
the study to other denominations besides the United Methodist Church, this study makes
an important contribution in understanding the determinants of clergy wages. Further,
this research provides insights into the development of a general theory of clergy
executive compensation by employing the Clergy Compensation Framework (CCF).
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As a framework, the CCF contributes several useful elements to theory
development. The CCF identifies individual decision makers as the actors requiring a
cogent theory of clergy compensation to clearly define the assumptions behind human
behavior and decision-making.
The CCF also provides an opportunity to examine clergy compensation from the
perspective of several units of analysis. An analyst can study individual clergy, the local
church, or the denomination as the unit of analysis. If there are research questions,
relating to clergy compensation that involve religious markets or the clergy labor markets
as the units of analysis, the CCF provides for such inquiry as well.
The scope of the CCF extends beyond the religious context. The framework has
applications in studying nonprofit executive compensation because the market for
executive labor and the competitive market between organizations have been previously
omitted from studies on the salaries of nonprofit managers. Further, the framework may
be used to examine the salaries of nonprofit executives in federated and franchise
relationships.
5.3 The Theory
The degree to which clergy, as agents, achieve the aims of their principal, the
church and/or denomination, is the main avenue through which we can understand what
factors influence clergy salaries. Denominational churches achieve their goals through a
hierarchical relationship suggestive of a nonprofit franchise. The franchise / hierarchical
arrangement places clergy in a "dual agency" tension. Clergy affiliated with hierarchical
denominations operate as dual agents because they serve two principals, the
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congregation, and the denomination. If clergy are in autonomous churches, the local
church is the sole principal.
Ordination stratifies the labor market differentiating clergy from their nonordained colleagues. Further, ordination functions as a signal of commitment to the
denomination and legitimacy to the laity resulting in financial benefit to ministers.
Clergy are also rewarded on the basis of managerial scope, where they receive higher
wages as compensation for their assumed managerial acumen and responsibility.
This research can also apply to churches outside of the United Methodist Church
as they seek to explain the variance in clergy salaries within their denomination.
Principal-agent theory can be applied to churches where the clergy are the agents and the
local church is the sole principal.
This study recognizes that clergy operate in a labor market. Churches without a
hierarchy have a labor market that is comparatively more competitive. The present
research suggests that within the more autonomous denominations there may also be
market stratification on the basis of some attribute that differentiates clergy from one
another and signals commitment. For example, as mentioned previously, Perl and Chang
(2000) suggest that education stratifies the clergy labor market for female clergy.
At some point, churches engage in salary negotiations with their clergy. The loci
for the dialogue are religious production and labor supply. When one asks how much
should we pay the preacher, the underlying questions are: 1) What does the preacher
produce that is worthy of receiving compensation; 2) Can we get the same product more
cheaply; and 3) Can we afford the services of a minister?
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Religious production is similar to much of nonprofit production in that many of
its benefits are difficult to evaluate because they are intangibles. For the preacher, the
intangibility challenge is exacerbated by the fact that most congregants do not observe
what preachers actually do outside of the worship event (McMillan, 2002).
Salary, in many ways, is a measure of value where a higher salary is associated
with more value. Unfortunately, the services provided by clergy are not valued as highly
as comparable professionals with the same level of education (Hudnut-Beumler, 1999).
Bonifield and Mills (1980) compare wage-setting for clergy to wage-setting in the
public sector. In their estimation, salary is a residual determined by the difference in
anticipated revenues and expenses. Since the ministerial service is delivered as a free
good, charges do not accrue directly to the users. Congregants benefit from the service
whether they contribute financially (signaling value for the religious product) or withhold
their donations, assuming there are no dues or membership fees.
The under-valuing of clergy by congregants is furthered by the availability of
lower-priced substitutes. When clergy are perceived as having no distinct talent, salaries
are low (Bonifield and Mills, 1980). As seen in our clergy sample, over a third of clergy
serving as lead ministers are not Full Connection or Provisional Members of the North
Georgia Annual Conference (non-ordained). It is difficult to argue that a clergyperson
brings unique attributes to an appointment and is therefore, deserving of a higher wage
when a number of churches are receiving, from their perspective, a similar product at a
lower price.
Clergy in the 1960's were on par with other professionals financially. After the
1960's, religious leaders were no longer viewed as a part of the cultural elite (Hudnut-
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Beumler, 1999). Chang and Bompadre (1999) suggest that alternative opportunities
outside the church for males in the service sector drained the potential clergy labor pool
of prime candidates. Clergy jobs, then, were lower in the job queue for men reflecting
the loss of prestige (Reskin and Roos, 1990).
Since the prime candidates in the labor queue were in decline, secondary
candidates (women) were given opportunities to fill the ranks of the clergy.
Denominations had to choose between higher wages to attract their first choice or allow
the market price to clear while admitting women.
Further, mainline Protestant churches have experienced a steady decline in
membership (Chang and Bompadre, 1999; Chaves, 2002). Researchers suggest that it
takes at least two hundred members to support a clergyperson full-time (Chang and
Bompadre, 1999). The ratio of members-to-clergy has been decreasing. The decline in
clergy status coincided with a decline in real income for ministers. The comparably
lower wages and a lack of prestige have contributed to a crisis in the clergy labor supply
for the local parish.
There is no lack of clergy (McMillan and Price, 2003). There is a dearth of clergy
willing to serve the churches that are available, many of which have small memberships
and are located in rural areas many of which lack the financial wherewithal to support a
professional preacher (e.g. under the 200 member threshold) (Hudnut-Beumler, 1999;
McMillan, 2003; Chaves, 2004). Chaves (2002) suggests that rural churches are
particularly disadvantaged due to the lack of geographic mobility for both two-career
families and older second-career persons entering the ministry. Further, more mature
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persons who enter the ministry in mid-life may have higher salary requirements than their
younger counterparts.
Pallotta (2008) would argue that as religious nonprofits, churches are
paradigmatic of what he calls nonprofit ideology characterized by a "dysfunctional
mentality based on deprivation." The nonprofit ideology expects religious leaders to
provide a labor donation and accept lower wages. Oster (1998) confirmed the negative
impact of religious affiliation when she noted that nonprofit executives who led
organizations with a religious affiliation were penalized financially compared to their
counterparts who led secular organizations. The church may have to re-think its
preference for financial asceticism in order to attract quality leadership. Alternatively,
one cannot discount the effects of non-pecuniary aspects of ministerial employment that
dominate labor supply choices perhaps more than assumed in other markets.
5.4 Policy Implications and Future Research
Churches, as member-serving nonprofit organizations, are bearers of the public
trust who receive benefits from their tax status (Chaves, 2002; Salamon, 2002).
Receiving tax privileges places them in an arena of higher accountability. Policymakers
seeking higher degrees of accountability will find this study helpful enabling them to be
better informed about the complex nature of the church and the challenges in applying
models from either the for-profit or nonprofit sector to the church without the appropriate
cautions. Using this research, stakeholders can evaluate the degree to which
congregations are public-serving, member-serving, or even pastor serving.
An additional implication for policy is the degree to which ordination mitigates
gender and racial bias within the sample. Previous wage research suggests that ethnic
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minorities and women will have lower salaries. However, neither the racial variables nor
gender was significant in this investigation. Credentialing perhaps signals a more
desirable candidate for employment and may serve to overcome certain biases.
Future research on clergy compensation would include a national sample of
churches and clergy to determine if the present model is applicable to denominations
besides the United Methodist Church. The national study might also include church
boards to determine what criteria they use to evaluate and reward clergy. Additional
survey work might include ascertaining the number of hours worked by the clergy and
data as to their career paths both within and outside of the church. The data from their
service within the church would assist in testing the dual agency hypothesis.
Figure 5.2 displays a proposed typology of the dual agency relationship for clergy
in the United Methodist Church. Clergy must meet the aims of the local church (e.g.
church growth) and the aims of the denomination (e.g. apportionment payments). A
church that is dissatisfied with the pastor’s performance can seek the removal of the
pastor. Likewise, a bishop can move a pastor if the bishop determines that a move is in
the best interest of the church, the pastor, or the Conference.
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High Church Mission
Low Church Mission

Local Church’s Mission

Questionable

Celebrated

Dispensable

Tolerated

Low Denominational Aims

High Denominational Aims

Denominational Aims

Harvey (2010)

Figure 5.2 Dual Agency Appointment and Compensation Matrix

As mentioned previously, denominational churches are analogous to nonprofit
federated/franchise systems (Oster, 1992; Young and Faulk, 2010). In order to increase
apportionment receipts, bishops appoint franchise clergy, the “celebrated” in Figure 5.2.
The celebrated clergy are those who demonstrate the ability to meet the aims of both the
local church and the denomination. This research suggests that the celebrated clergy are
also the more highly compensated clergy. The celebrated clergy are also analogous to
those who receive primary sector jobs in segmented market theory (Kalleberg and
Sørensen, 1979). An additional advantage to achieving celebrated status is that over time
ministers may experience a shift in the monopsonistic relationship with the denomination
so that the relationship reflects more of a bilateral monopoly (Althauser, 1989). In the
present case, a bilateral monopoly means that the firm specific skills of the celebrated
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clergy make them a valuable asset to the denomination because there are few readily
available substitutes for the celebrated clergy. It is in the best interests of the clergy to
remain with the denomination because other employers do not value their firm specific
skills (Althauser, 1989).
The “dispensable” clergy are those who do not meet the aims of the local church
or the denomination and are subject to frequent reassignment or must remain in
assignments that pay less, consistent with the concept of secondary sector jobs (Kalleberg
and Sørensen, 1979).
The “tolerated” clergy are the company clergy whose priority is to please the
denomination while managing, as opposed to leading, the local church. The
denomination/franchise will keep these clergy in place as long as the local church will
tolerate them. These clergy are located in both upper-stratum and lower-stratum
churches.
The “questionable” clergy serve the local church well but may not pay all of their
apportionments/franchise fees. Whether this minister is reassigned or remains for an
additional year is questionable. None of these categories is static. Since the clergy of the
North Georgia Annual Conference are evaluated and appointed to churches each year, the
designation may change as seen in Figure 5.3. Movement within the diagram is achieved
by changes in achieving the mission-related goals of either the congregation or the
denomination.
Celebrated ministers may become tolerated when they can not maintain growth in
terms of congregational goals. They can become dispensable if they fail to achieve either
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the denominational or the congregational aims. Questionable status is attained when the
denominational goals are not met.
Ministers in the questionable category, whose churches begin to pay the
apportionment or increase the payment amount, can move to celebrated status. A
questionable minister who leads a church that continuously fails to pay receives the
designation “dispensable.” She/he will be penalized with reassignment to a less

High Church Mission

Questionable

Celebrated

Low Church Mission

Local Church’s Mission

prestigious appointment possibly with a lower salary.

Dispensable

Tolerated

Low Denominational Aims

High Denominational Aims

Denominational Aims

Harvey (2010)

Figure 5.3 Dual Agency Dynamic Flow Diagram

Tolerated clergy can move to celebrated status by improvement in attaining the
congregation's mission-related goal of increasing the number of faith-adherents. If they
shift their focus and begin to meet the goal of the local church without maintaining the
expected level of apportionment payments, these ministers may become questionable. If
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tolerated ministers lapse in apportionment payments and can not achieve the local church
growth aims, they may become dispensable.
Dispensable clergy may shift to tolerated as they increase the apportionment
payment. They move to questionable status when they increase faith-adherents. If the
dispensable ministers are able to achieve "dual agency" they can move to the celebrated
category.
Future research would also include a mapping of the clergy into the typology.
The mapping of the data into the quadrants would lend support to the proposed typology
but would also provide a point of departure for predicting the placement of clergy into
their respective assignments.
Churches, like other nonprofits, will continue to contend with the tension between
the mission and the market as it relates to clergy wages. This research will be useful to
church boards as they continue to struggle with questions of clergy compensation and its
implications for recruitment, retention, and deployment by advancing questions about
agency, the clergy labor market, and the role of credentialing as it relates to clergy wages.
As donors gain a better understanding of the determinants of clergy compensation they
are empowered to make better giving decisions regarding the utilization of their
contributions. Both scholars and practitioners can benefit as they use this study as a point
of departure for salary development guidelines as clergy seek to fulfill their callings and
contribute to the Church’s mission while providing for themselves and their families.
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APPENDIX A
Clergy and Nonprofit Compensation Research Summary
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Table A.1 Clergy Compensation Research Summary
Scholars

Model

Findings

Organization Type
and Sample Size

Income is a
function of
educational level,
seminary prestige,
and denominational
characteristics

Education benefits
clergy financially
in more
theologically
conservative
denominations.
Women benefit
from seminary
education more in
denominations that
do not require and
M.Div. Seminary
prestige is
important under
circumstances
where
congregations hire
clergy directly.

Ordained Women
and Men Study
1993-1994 Hartford
Seminary
N = 2541

*McMillan and
Price (2001)

Ministerial salaries
are related to
church size and the
clergy labor
market.

Church size and
geographic factors
are key
determinants.

N = 14998

*Graham (2007)

Clergy salary is
related to gender.
Female clergy
positions are more
likely to be in
churches with
fewer financial
resources,

Gender gaps
present in salaries.
Fewer clergy are
assigned to
churches with
fewer resources
than their male
counterparts.

Annual Conference
Journals for Texas
in 2006
N = 1000

*Perl and Chang
(2000)
*Not peer reviewed
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Table A.1 Clergy Compensation Research Summary (continued)
Scholars

Model

Trawick and Lile
(2007)

Clergy
compensation is
determined by
religious market
competition,
denominational
market share,
county-level
characteristics and
congregational
characteristics.

Zech (2007)

Human capital,
performance, and
promotion
tournaments are the
determinants for
pastors'
compensation.

Findings

A less concentrated
religious market
results in a higher
salary level as do
the number of
converts, missionrelated outreach,
funds availability,
an older
congregation,
higher county
population, and
higher education of
the populace.
Urban
congregations will
pay less.
Female clergy are
paid less.
Membership size,
community size,
and the number of
clergy supervised
positively affected
clergy salaries.
Performance is
weakly significant.
Denominational
polity does not
seem to have an
effect.
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Organization Type
and Sample Size

N = 13825

N = 747

Table A.1 Clergy Compensation Research Summary (continued)
Scholars

Haney (2008)

Model

Findings

Clergy
compensation is
determined by
congregational
factors, clergy
individual
characteristics, and
denominational
polity, and region.

Size (worship
attendance) clergy
education,
experience, and
congregational
wealth matters.
Hierarchical
denominational
pastors receive
more in salary than
their counterparts.
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Organizational
Type and Sample
Size
N = 425

Table A.2 Nonprofit Executive Compensation Research
Scholars

Model

Findings

Oster (1998)

Salary is a function
of organizational size
(assets), religious
affiliation, gender of
chief executive,
percentage of income
from private donors,
and organizational
type.

Organizational size,
and religious
affiliation
significant at p<.05
positively affecting
salaries.

Arts, Education,
Environmental,
Health Research,
Hospital
N = 95

Salary is a function
of organizational size
(assets), religious
affiliation, Princeton
ratings, and
endowment annual
expenditure.

Organizational size
significant at p<.05
positively affecting
salaries.

Higher Education
N = 57

Salary is a function
of organizational size
(assets), religious
affiliation, gender of
chief executive, and
percentage of income
from private donors.

Organizational size,
religious affiliation
significant at p<.05
positively affecting
salaries.

Social Services
N = 78
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Organization Type
and Sample Size

Table A.2 Nonprofit Executive Compensation Research (continued)
Scholars

Model

Oster (1998)

Salary is a function
of organizational size
(assets), occupancy
rate, and university
affiliation.

Organizational size,
university affiliation
significant at p<.05
positively affecting
salaries.

Hospitals
N = 31

Salary is a function
of organizational size
(assets), community
vs. private
foundation, family
members on the
board, and gender of
chief executive.

Organizational size,
family members on
the board
significant at p<.05
positively affecting
salaries.

Foundations
N = 45
Private foundations
n = 33

Changes in executive
compensation are
determined by
changes in revenue
and the program
spending ratio and
monitoring by an
oversight agency.

Changes in revenue
and changes in
spending ratio
significant at p<.05
positively affecting
salaries.

Educational, Medical
and Charitable
Nonprofits
N = 331

Managerial pay is a
function of firm size
(assets), program
expense ratio, grants
plus public direct and
indirect public
support (fundraising),
government grants

Firm size is strongly
significant while
program expense is
weakly significant
across particular
NTEE categories.
The number of board
members is also
significant reducing
the salary of
managers with the
addition of board
members.

N= 32,146 yearobservations over
five years.

Hallock
(2002)

Findings
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Organization Type
and Sample Size

Table A.2 Nonprofit Executive Compensation Research (continued)
Scholars

Model

Findings

Frumkin and
Keating
(2001)

Compensation is a
function of total fixed
assets, total program
expenses,
administrative
efficiency (ratio of
non-administrative
expenses to total
expenses),
dollar growth in
contributions,
commercial revenues
as a share of total
revenues, the ratio of
liquid assets to
expenses, and
endowments to total
assets ratio.

Total fixed assets***,
total program
expenses**,
commercial revenue
share***, and
endowments ratio*
positively affecting
salaries.

*Twombly
and Gantz
(2001)

Executive
compensation related
to size, activities, and
reliance on different
types of revenue,
program service
revenues,
management, general
and fundraising
expenses.

N = 55,000
NP executives at
hospitals and higher
ed are paid more,
Larger NP's pay
more, Hosp and High
Ed likely to
supplement income
with benefits and
deferred comp.
Expense accounts and
allowances are
important
supplements in faithrelated NP's. Pay
levels vary NP execs
are paid relatively
lower wages than FP
executives.
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Organization Type
and Sample Size
N = 15350

Table A.2 Nonprofit Executive Compensation Research (continued)
Scholars

Model

Findings

Organization Type
and Sample Size

Gray and
Benson
(2003)

Executive
compensation is a
function of human
capital factors
(education and
experience), firm
size, organizational
affiliation, gender,
and organizational
performance.

Human capital,
organizational
affiliation, firm size
significant at p < .10
positively affecting
salaries.

Nonprofit Small
Business
Development
Centers, Small
Business
Administration
N = 114

Krishnan,
Yetman, and
Yetman
(2006)

Changes in executive
compensation are
determined by
changes in revenue
and the program
spending ratio

Changes in revenue
and the program
spending ratio
positively affect
salaries.

Sample of Nonprofits
N = 6826

*Twombly
and Harvey
(2007)

Executive
compensation is
directly related to
financial
performance
measures.

Organizational size,
age, and industry
have a significant and
positive relationship
on nonprofit
executive
compensation. No
evidence of a pay-forperformance link as
measured by the
financial indicators.

National Nonprofit
Research Database
(NNRD)
N = 1045

Mesch and
Rooney
(2008)

Fundraiser
compensation is
directly related to the
amount of funds
raised.

There is a positive
and significant link
between pay and
performance for
fundraising
professionals.
A gender-wage gap
exists.

Association of
Fundraising
Professionals Annual
Compensation and
Benefits Study
N = 2439
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Table B.1 Correlation Statistics
1
1. Compensation

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1.00

2. Education

0.36

1.00

3. Education squared

0.36

1.00

4. Tenure 2007

0.06

0.12

0.13

1.00

5. Tenure squared

0.03

0.08

0.08

0.91

1.00

6. Years of service in 2007

0.29

0.30

0.29

0.27

0.23

7. Years of service squared

0.21

0.26

0.26

0.27

0.24

0.97

1.00

8. Ordained

0.25

0.56

0.50

0.07

0.06

0.25

0.20

1.00

-0.17

0.05

0.06

0.23

0.17

0.48

0.51

0.01

9. Age

1.00

1.00

10. Age squared

-0.22

0.04

0.05

0.23

0.17

0.47

0.52

0.01

11. Female

-0.15

-0.09

-0.09

-0.12

-0.10

-0.28

-0.27

-0.07

12. Black

-0.07

0.02

0.03

0.06

0.04

-0.06

-0.10

-0.02

13. Other Race

-0.06

0.00

-0.01

0.03

0.03

-0.14

-0.12

-0.01

14. Married

0.08

0.02

0.02

0.09

0.07

0.11

0.11

0.06

15. Membership size

0.76

0.25

0.26

0.09

0.10

0.26

0.22

0.11

16. Net Assets

0.66

0.26

0.26

0.09

0.09

0.23

0.20

0.12

17. Clergy Staff Expense

0.71

0.27

0.28

0.19

0.20

0.25

0.23

0.08

18. Lay Staff Expense Percentage

0.53

0.26

0.25

-0.08

-0.11

0.10

0.02

0.26

19. Competition

0.21

0.12

0.12

0.07

0.04

0.02

0.01

0.06

20. Urban

0.27

0.14

0.14

0.13

0.10

0.10

0.08

0.09

21. Suburb

-0.13

-0.07

-0.07

-0.13

-0.12

-0.11

-0.10

-0.04

22. Worship attendance 2007

0.81

0.27

0.28

0.12

0.12

0.25

0.20

0.13

23. Program Expense

0.70

0.27

0.27

0.15

0.16

0.25

0.21

0.10

24. Apportionments

0.81

0.30

0.30

0.12

0.13

0.28

0.24

0.12

High correlation
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Table B.1 (continued)
9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

1. Compensation
2. Education
3. Education squared
4. Tenure 2007
5. Tenure squared
6. Years of service in 2007
7. Years of service squared
8. Ordained
9. Age

1.00
0.99

1.00

-0.04

-0.06

1.00

0.02

0.00

0.09

1.00

-0.07

-0.06

-0.03

-0.07

1.00

0.02

0.02

-0.40

-0.21

0.04

1.00

15. Membership size

-0.06

-0.08

-0.13

0.00

-0.03

0.09

1.00

16. Net Assets

-0.03

-0.05

-0.05

-0.04

-0.04

0.07

0.56

1.00

17. Clergy Staff Expense

-0.01

-0.03

-0.12

-0.08

0.01

0.09

0.77

0.62

18. Lay Staff Expense Percentage

-0.18

-0.22

0.00

0.01

-0.09

0.02

0.30

0.32

0.00

-0.01

0.06

0.28

-0.01

-0.03

0.28

0.30

10. Age squared
11. Female
12. Black
13. Other Race
14. Married

19. Competition
20. Urban

0.05

0.03

0.08

0.21

0.00

-0.09

0.25

0.26

21. Suburb

-0.17

-0.16

-0.05

-0.09

0.05

0.03

-0.13

-0.17

22. Worship attendance 2007

-0.09

-0.11

-0.15

-0.06

-0.01

0.11

0.92

0.56

23. Program Expense

-0.05

-0.08

-0.13

-0.10

0.03

0.10

0.82

0.54

24. Apportionments

-0.05

-0.08

-0.13

-0.11

-0.03

0.10

0.87

0.68

High correlation
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Table B.1 (continued)
17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

1. Compensation
2. Education
3. Education squared
4. Tenure 2007
5. Tenure squared
6. Years of service in 2007
7. Years of service squared
8. Ordained
9. Age
10. Age squared
11. Female
12. Black
13. Other Race
14. Married
15. Membership size
16. Net Assets
17. Clergy Staff Expense

1.00

18. Lay Staff Expense Percentage

0.20

1.00

19. Competition

0.20

0.17

20. Urban

0.23

0.21

0.63

1.00

21. Suburb

-0.14

-0.05

-0.39

-0.69

1.00

22. Worship attendance 2007

0.82

0.35

0.22

0.20

-0.09

1.00

23. Program Expense

0.78

0.28

0.18

0.21

-0.12

0.87

1.00

24. Apportionments

0.86

0.36

0.20

0.24

-0.13

0.91

0.89

1.00

High correlation
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1.00

Table B.2 Variable Description Table
Variable

Variable Description

Age

Age in years of clergy in June of 2007

Education

Years of education in 2007

Tenure

The number of years in the present assignment

Experience

Years of service as a United Methodist minister

Female

Dichotomous variable identifying female clergy

Married

Dichotomous variable distinguishing married clergy

Ordained

Dichotomous variable specifying ordained ministers

Black

Dichotomous variable for black clergy

Other Race
Membership

Dichotomous variable differentiating clergy who are
neither black nor white
Church membership in 2007

Net assets

Net assets in 2007

Clergy staff
expense
Lay staff expense
percentage
Competition

The amount of money spent on clergy staff
exclusive of the senior minister's wages in 2007
The amount of money expended on lay staff as a
percentage of total church expenditures in 2007
The number of Christian denominated churches
located in the same county
Dichotomous variable specifying churches located in
an urban area
Dichotomous variable distinguishing churches
located in a suburban area
The average worship attendance in 2007

Urban
Suburban
Worship
Program expense
Apportionments
paid

The amount of money expended for ministry
programs in 2007
The amount of money spent towards the conference
apportionment in 2007
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Table B.3 Data Summary Statistics Full Model
Variable
Compensation
Education
Education squared
Tenure
Tenure squared
Years of service
Years of service squared
Ordained member of North
Georgia
Age
Age squared
Female
Black
Other Race
Married
Membership size (logged)
Net Assets (logged $)
Clergy staff expense
Lay staff expense percentage
(logged)
Competition
Urban
Suburban
Worship attendance (logged)
Program Expense (thousands
of $)
Amount of apportionments
paid (logged $)

Observations
747
485
485
747
747
743
743
747

Mean
Minimum Maximum
47500.84
1155.60 260604.20
19.41
12.00
25.00
379.52
144.00
625.00
4.40
1.00
28.00
34.86
1.00
784.00
15.83
1.00
48.00
386.36
1.00
2304.00
0.64
0.00
1.00

747
747
747
747
747
747
747
739
747
586

54.13
3052.22
0.18
0.16
0.03
0.87
5.31
13.99
12.61
-2.09

23.00
529.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.10
10.46
0.00
-5.87

83.00
6889.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
9.21
17.58
500.88
1.19

747
747
747
747
747

123.99
0.37
0.40
4.49
21.40

18.00
0.00
0.00
1.61
0.00

424.00
1.00
1.00
8.05
700.00

740

9.25

3.58

13.41
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Table B.4 Data Summary Statistics Upper-Stratum
Variable
Compensation
Tenure
Tenure squared
Years of service
Years of service squared
Ordained member of North
Georgia
Age
Age squared
Female
Black
Other Race
Married
Membership size (logged)
Net Assets (logged $)
Clergy staff expense
Lay staff expense percentage
Competition
Urban
Suburban
Worship attendance (logged)
Program Expense (thousands
of $)
Amount of apportionments
paid (logged $)

Observations
475
475
475
475
475
475

Mean
Minimum Maximum
62932.12
3466.80 260604.20
4.38
1.00
28.00
34.30
1.00
784.00
20.29
1.00
48.00
544.76
1.00
2304.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

475
475
475
475
475
475
475
470
475
424
475
475
475
475
475

54.60
3096.58
0.17
0.14
0.03
0.88
5.81
14.43
19.75
-1.91
136.40
0.44
0.37
4.91
32.31

28.00
784.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
2.64
11.00
0.00
-5.87
18.00
0.00
0.00
2.08
0.00

83.00
6889.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
9.21
17.58
500.88
-0.60
424.00
1.00
1.00
8.05
700.00

469

9.81

3.58

13.41

99

Table B.5 Data Summary Statistics Lower-Stratum
Variable
Compensation
Tenure
Tenure squared
Years of service
Years of service squared
Ordained member of North
Georgia
Age
Age squared
Female
Black
Other Race
Married
Membership size (logged)
Net Assets (logged $)
Clergy staff expense
Lay staff expense percentage
Competition
Urban
Suburban
Worship attendance (logged)
Program Expense (thousands
of $)
Amount of apportionments
paid (logged $)

Observations
272
272
272
268
268
272

Mean
Minimum Maximum
20552.83
1155.60
56845.89
4.45
1.00
28.00
35.84
1.00
784.00
7.93
1.00
36.00
105.60
1.00
1296.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

272
272
272
272
272
272
272
269
272
162
272
272
272
272
272

53.31
2974.75
0.19
0.18
0.02
0.86
4.42
13.22
0.14
-2.56
102.34
0.24
0.47
3.75
2.36

23.00
529.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.10
10.46
0.00
-4.97
18.00
0.00
0.00
1.61
0.00

82.00
6724.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
5.98
17.31
16.20
1.19
424.00
1.00
1.00
5.42
18.58

271

8.28

4.60

10.03
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Inflection point: 20.6 years of education
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Figure B.1 Clergy Compensation Model Curvilinear Effect of Education on
Compensation
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Figure B.2 Clergy Compensation Model Curvilinear Effect of Age on Compensation
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Figure B.3 Clergy Compensation Model Curvilinear Effect of Tenure on Compensation
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Figure B.4 Clergy Compensation Model Curvilinear Effect of Years of Service on
Compensation
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Table B.6 Comparison Model Determinants of Clergy Executive Compensation
Variables
Tenure
Tenure squared
Years of Service
Years of Service squared

Upper
Stratum

Lower
Stratum

0.0287***
(0.0107)
-0.00121*
(0.000642)
0.0120**
(0.00545)
-0.000189
(0.000119)

-0.0365
(0.0242)
0.00172
(0.00106)
0.0291
(0.0202)
-0.000901
(0.000668)

Ordained
Age

0.0226**
(0.0100)
Age squared
-0.000280***
(9.47e-05)
Female
0.0302
(0.0406)
Black
-0.0624
(0.0428)
Other race
-0.0295
(0.0831)
Married
-0.00294
(0.0461)
Average Membership in 2007 (logged)
0.125***
(0.0455)
Net Assets (logged)
0.101***
(0.0227)
Clergy Staff Expense
-0.000343
(per thousand $)
(0.000392)
Lay Staff Expense Percentage (logged)
0.0462**
(0.0204)
Competition
-0.000102
(0.000155)
Urban
0.115**
(0.0473)
Suburban
0.0433
(0.0415)
Average Worship Attendance 2007
0.311***
(logged)
(0.0452)
Program Expense
-0.00100***
(per thousand $)
(0.000338)
Apportionments Paid (logged)
0.0307
(0.0203)
Constant
7.767***
(0.413)
Observations
413
R-squared
0.82

-0.0292
(0.0223)
0.000283
(0.000217)
0.00582
(0.0924)
-0.175
(0.106)
0.115
(0.318)
0.119
(0.108)
0.167*
(0.0883)
0.0819
(0.0560)
0.0119
(0.0228)
0.0402
(0.0421)
-0.000638
(0.000558)
0.0340
(0.116)
-0.0771
(0.0920)
0.282***
(0.0981)
-0.00486
(0.0113)
0.228***
(0.0610)
7.094***
(0.945)
155
0.63

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B.7 Interaction Terms Model Results
Clergy Compensation Model
Clergy Salary

VARIABLE
Tenure
Tenure squared
Years of Service
Years of Service squared
Age
Age squared
Female
Black
Other race
Married

Average Membership in 2007 (logged)
Net Assets (logged)
Clergy Staff Expense
(per thousand $)
Lay Staff Expense Percentage (logged)
Competition
Urban
Suburban
Average Worship Attendance 2007
(logged)
Program Expense
(per thousand $)
Apportionments Paid (logged)
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-0.0365**
(0.0182)
0.00172**
(0.000795)
0.0291*
(0.0152)
-0.000901*
(0.000503)
-0.0292*
(0.0168)
0.000283*
(0.000163)
0.00582
(0.0695)
-0.175**
(0.0795)
0.115
(0.239)
0.119
(0.0813)
0.167**
(0.0665)
0.0819*
(0.0422)
0.0119
(0.0171)
0.0402
(0.0316)
-0.000638
(0.000420)
0.0340
(0.0870)
-0.0771
(0.0692)
0.282***
(0.0739)
-0.00486
(0.00854)
0.228***
(0.0459)

Table B.7 Interaction Terms Model Results (continued)
Clergy Compensation Model
Clergy Salary

VARIABLE X Ordained
Tenure
Tenure squared
Years of Service
Years of Service squared
Age
Age squared
Female
Black
Other race
Married

Average Membership in 2007 (logged)
Net Assets (logged)
Clergy Staff Expense
(per thousand $)
Lay Staff Expense Percentage (logged)
Competition
Urban
Suburban
Average Worship Attendance 2007
(logged)
Program Expense
(per thousand $)
Apportionments Paid (logged)
Constant
Observations
R-squared

0.0652***
(0.0221)
-0.00293***
(0.00109)
-0.0171
(0.0165)
0.000712
(0.000521)
0.0518**
(0.0204)
-0.000562***
(0.000197)
0.0244
(0.0840)
0.112
(0.0938)
-0.144
(0.258)
-0.122
(0.0974)
-0.0419
(0.0850)
0.0194
(0.0498)
-0.0122
(0.0171)
0.00597
(0.0396)
0.000536
(0.000457)
0.0808
(0.103)
0.120
(0.0844)
0.0283
(0.0906)
0.00386
(0.00855)
-0.197***
(0.0516)
7.094***
(0.711)
568
0.858

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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